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Abstract—Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems
(cITS) are a promising technology to enhance driving safety and
efficiency. Vehicles communicate wirelessly with other vehicles
and infrastructure, thereby creating a highly dynamic and
heterogeneously managed ad-hoc network. It is these network
properties that make it a challenging task to protect integrity
of the data and guarantee its correctness. A major component
is the problem that traditional security mechanisms like PKI-
based asymmetric cryptography only exclude outsider attackers
that do not possess key material. However, because attackers can
be insiders within the network (i.e., possess valid key material),
this approach cannot detect all possible attacks. In this survey,
we present misbehavior detection mechanisms that can detect
such insider attacks based on attacker behavior and information
analysis. In contrast to well-known intrusion detection for classi-
cal IT systems, these misbehavior detection mechanisms analyze
information semantics to detect attacks, which aligns better with
highly application-tailored communication protocols foreseen for
cITS. In our survey, we provide an extensive introduction to the
cITS ecosystem and discuss shortcomings of PKI-based security.
We derive and discuss a classification for misbehavior detection
mechanisms, provide an in-depth overview of seminal papers on
the topic, and highlight open issues and possible future research
trends.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the field of computer science, securing sys-
tems against malicious attackers has become a fundamen-
tal requirement for safe, secure, and dependable operation
of applications. Today, professional attacks against systems,
which are mounted by large criminal organizations or even
governments, are becoming increasingly common [1], [2]. At
the same time, computer systems are increasingly intertwined
with the real world, making them more appealing targets.
The term cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been coined to
encompass systems that are characterized by a large de-
ployment of networked devices equipped with both sensors
and actuators [3]. They are distinguished from traditional
embedded systems, where individual nodes interact with the
real world in strongly constrained environments. In contrast,
CPS are highly networked, deployed in large regions, and may
contain nodes with heterogeneous computational power. The
content transferred in these networks is highly predictable,
relating directly to real-world phenomena [4], [3], a fact that
enables novel techniques to detect attacks, collectively referred
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to as misbehavior detection. A prominent example of such
a system is a cooperative intelligent transportation system
(cITS), which consists of vehicles, road-side units and back-
end systems, and which is the main focus of this survey. Attack
detection in general is an essential second layer of security for
networks, especially for widely deployed networked systems
in potentially hostile environments, where attackers may have
physical access to a subset of the system. Furthermore, the
impact of such attacks is much greater, as they can easily be
tailored to cause real-world harm or loss of life. Therefore,
misbehavior detection in both CPS and cITS is essential for
the secure and thus safe operation of these systems.
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems are networks
designed to provide a variety of benefits [5], [6]. These include
improved road-safety, greener driving through improved traffic
management, support for partially autonomous vehicles, and
infotainment services such as traffic information services. The
characterizing communication paradigm of all these applica-
tions is that sensors are used to measure real world conditions,
which are then communicated over a ubiquitous network. This
network is built up by equipping each vehicle with a wireless
interface, creating a dynamic ad-hoc network that can be ac-
cessed without further overhead, which is commonly referred
to as a vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET). The VANET can
also include infrastructure components, referred to as road side
unit (RSU), which are sparsely positioned along the road. The
resulting network that includes sparse infrastructure is referred
to as a vehicular network. Vehicles use the VANET to send
and receive information, building a world model from received
messages, which is used for the applications mentioned above.
However, vehicles can also sense local information through
a variety of sensors, especially with recent developments in
partially autonomous driving. This information, communicated
through vehicle-internal networks, is used for autonomous
decision making by the vehicle, either in dedicated driving
scenarios or with complete autonomy. These applications are
often supported by additional infrastructure in the back-end
through the Internet. These extensions of a vehicular network,
where cooperation between autonomous vehicles and back-end
is central, are collectively referred to as cITS.
In addition to the benefits discussed above, cITS are ex-
pected to support the deployment of autonomous driving
technologies with cooperation between vehicles. Both exist-
ing applications, as well as envisioned future developments,
present a host of new security challenges. One of these is
the integrity and correctness of transmitted information that
is exchanged between vehicles that use cITS applications. A
wide body of work is aiming to provide this protection, which
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2can broadly categorized into proactive and reactive mecha-
nisms [7]. Proactive security aims to prevent potential attackers
from system access, whereas reactive security assumes that
malicious activity can be present within the system and needs
to be detected and corrected. Note that in this context, outsider
refers to an attacker without system access, whereas insider
refers to a user with system access (i.e., able to transmit
legitimate messages), rather than the physical location of the
attacker.
More specifically, proactive security refers to any kind
of mechanism that enforces a security policy. This category
includes mechanisms such as integrity and authenticity checks
(e.g., verifying cryptographic signatures), access control mech-
anisms and many other systems. For instance, in cITS, the
typical approach is to use public key infrastructures (PKIs) and
only issue key material and certificates to vehicles and other
authorized entities. All unauthorized entities are excluded
from the system, because their messages do not contain valid
signatures. The state of the art for such PKIs is discussed in
detail in Section III-B. This creates a trusted perimeter that en-
compasses all authorized entities, requiring potential attackers
to possess valid credentials to access the system, reducing the
number of attack vectors. However, if an attacker compromises
key material or otherwise manipulates the messages that are
transmitted, attacks can still be successful.
Therefore, proactive mechanisms have to be complemented
by reactive security. Reactive security consists of a detection
and reaction step, where attacks that are not prevented by
proactive security can be stopped. Misbehavior detection is
firmly positioned in the category of reactive security mech-
anisms and belongs to the detection step. In misbehavior
detection, the primary goal is to detect such attacks in the
cITS; this survey aims to provide an overview of existing
results in this new context. In Section III-D, we discuss
the attacks that are still possible in the context of proactive
security. This covers both general cITS and a specific example
application, cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) [8],
[9], [10], [11]. This application is a primary example of new
developments in the field of cITS, which has recently gained
the interest of the security community. This example also
demonstrates the connection to CPS by discussing attacks
on both the cyber (i.e., the network) and the physical (i.e.,
misbehavior by manipulating the process).
Reactive security mechanisms have a long history in tradi-
tional networks, where both intrusion detection systems (IDS)
and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are used. These are
actively researched and many surveys on the topics exist [12],
[13], [14], [15]. A general classification is through the method
of detection: either by recognizing known attack patterns
(signature-based), detection of anomalous behavior (anomaly-
based), or detection of specification deviations (specification-
based). Each of these approaches can be viewed as a classifier
of traffic as either benign or malicious. Misbehavior detection
instead classifies messages as correct or incorrect, where
correctness refers to whether the messages reflect the real
world. This involves application semantics, which exist beyond
the communication that is analyzed (e.g., physical laws and
processes in CPS and also cITS). An example is the area of
(a) Jamming attack
traffic jam ahead!
(b) Fake message injection attack
Fig. 1. Two examples for different types of misbehavior.
routing in ad-hoc networks, where the goal is to detect nodes
that exhibit incorrect or malicious forwarding behavior [16].
Because of the envisioned large-scale deployment and the
direct interaction with the physical world, it is likely that
intelligent transportation systems will attract a number of
attackers. Many different types of misbehavior and attacks
are conceivable, and we will provide an in-depth discussion
and categorization in Section IV. For now, consider two
example attacks to demonstrate the range of possibilities.
Figure 1a shows a jamming attack. Here, an attacker creates
noise on the wireless channel, which hinders the message
transfer between two benign vehicles. To mount this attack,
the attacker does not need any particular knowledge about
the semantics of the messages that the vehicles exchange. It
is enough for the attacker to know the specification of the
wireless communication channel, which is publicly available
in standard documents.
Figure 1b demonstrates a completely different type of
attack. Here, the attacker uses knowledge of the protocol
semantics to create a message that informs the vehicles ahead
of an (non-existent) traffic jam. Receiving vehicles will use
this message for routing decisions and might take an alternate
route. As a result, there might be less traffic on the original
road, which is a direct benefit for the attacker. The main
harm caused in this case is that vehicles might slow down
when approaching the non-existent traffic jam location, maybe
creating a real traffic jam. In addition, the traffic participants
might get confused in case they notice that there is no traffic
jam on the original road. As a result the user acceptance of
the system is lowered.
If we consider safety applications or automated driving [2],
it is conceivable that attacks on intelligent transportation
systems can even lead to accidents, possibly threatening the
lives of passengers. For instance, given a set of vehicles that
are using a platoon with reduced relative safety distance, an
attacker could inject a fake message that indicates one of
these vehicles is breaking, even though this is not the case. In
such a situation, vehicles will immediately respond and in the
worst case actually cause collisions to avoid the non-existent
breaking behavior claimed by the attacker. This type of attack
has been studied for its effectiveness in recent works [8],
3but suitable countermeasures require the ability to detect false
information [11]. This is exactly what misbehavior detection
is designed to do.
II. RELATED SURVEYS & CONTRIBUTION
There is a large variety of surveys [6] that discuss various
aspects of cITS security, including authentication schemes,
attack techniques, routing security, trust management, and
revocation. Compared to these works, we are more focused on
misbehavior detection as it relates to real-world processes, and
we aim to provide a detailed categorization of existing work.
We also place all of the works into the same cITS context,
which reveals some vulnerabilities related to assumptions
on the attacks that no longer hold. This categorization thus
provides a much deeper insight into the developments of the
field over the past two decades, compared to existing work.
There are recent surveys on the security of areas of which
cITS can be considered a subset, such as trust in mobile ad-
hoc networks (MANETs) [17], opportunistic networking [18],
and CPS [19], [3]. Although these clearly also address issues
related to cITS, our survey has limited the scope to be able
to address the topic in more detail, considering the area
of misbehavior detection more specifically. Other interesting
surveys that have synergies with this one include a study
on attacks and countermeasures for GNSS spoofing [20], a
system that is essential for safe operation of cITS, and a
study on social network cooperation mechanisms in cITS [21].
However, none of these surveys directly address security in
cITS as a primary focus; the unique requirements call for
different security mechanisms.
Recently, a number of authors have also written surveys
addressing security in cITS specifically. Azees et al. [22] pri-
marily focus on VANETs as a special case of MANETs, a view
that was common in the past, but which does not include in its’
scope the most safety-critical classes of attacks. Instead, the
authors are discussing at routing-oriented attacks and defence
mechanisms, while we focus on examining misbehavior de-
tection with respect to cITS applications. Hasrouny et al. [23]
and Sakiz & Sen [24] both address the cITS proper, but these
surveys both place a much different focus.
The work by Hasrouny et al. [23] can be considered a
broad introduction to the field, more akin to a tutorial: the
authors study the different attack techniques in a lot of detail.
They continue with an extensive description of standardization
efforts with respect to security. The authors finally describe
potential countermeasures for the discussed attacks. However,
due to the very broad scope of their work, they cannot go into
sufficient detail on detection specifically, and instead provide
scattered solutions for individual attacks. Our survey instead
aims at a much deeper understanding of the methods used
for misbehavior detection, classifying by different scheme
properties. In particular, we identify patterns in how the
literature tackles the topic of detection, and also classify the
privacy and generalizability of each scheme.
Sakiz & Sen [24] also provide a survey of detection mecha-
nisms for cITS: however, their scope of detection mechanisms
includes the largely parallel topic of routing security. This is
illustrated by the emphasis on denial of service, replay and
network layer attacks. For this reason, they are not able to go
into as much detail as we are able to on safety-critical attack
types, such as data injection attacks. Unlike their survey, we
provide a qualitative discussion of the detection mechanisms,
reflecting on their generalizability and what the weaknesses
of each approach are. Our classification focusses on shared
characteristics, which helps technical readers to identify which
schemes are comparable, and it helps researchers identify
parallels between different schemes, as well as gaps for future
work.
In this article, focus on the specific area of misbehavior
detection, providing a comprehensive survey of different mis-
behavior detection mechanisms for cITS. We also consider
the implications of this research for other CPS domains.
Due to the challenging network topology and application-
specific networking paradigms applied in cITS, we believe
that misbehavior detection mechanisms for these systems
offer interesting properties that can be transferred to other
use cases. In particular, the issue of data injection attacks
is a challenge that is also observed in other CPS, while
routing attacks such as those covered by previous surveys are
network-specific. Our main contributions can be summarized
as follows: noitemsep,nolistsep
• We start with a comprehensive overview of the state of the
art and current standardization efforts, including overall
cITS security in Section III.
• We define misbehavior, an attacker model, and a novel
taxonomy for misbehavior detection in Section IV.
• We provide an extensive overview of seminal misbehav-
ior detection works in Section V, using the taxonomy
as a guideline1. We also provide a more fine-grained
classification by how detection is performed, which helps
readers identify relevant classes of mechanisms that have
orthogonal functionality.
• We discuss solved and open challenges (Section VI)
and point out commonalities and differences of cITS
misbehavior detection and misbehavior detection in other
domains (Section VI-C).
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. cITS overview
The cITS system consists primarily of vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication,
which is proposed to be based on the IEEE 802.11p amend-
ment, which specifies MAC and PHY layers for short-
range communication between vehicles. Communication is
performed at 5.9 GHz with a communication range that is
typically between 100 and 500 meters, and which is highly
dependent on the scenario and buildings in the vicinity. IEEE
802.11p has gained world-wide adoption as a basis on top of
which standardization agencies are building cITS applications.
For example, the European telecommunications standardiza-
tion organization, ETSI, has a family of standards for cITS,
referred to as ITS-G5, which provides communication prim-
itives. On top of these, safety and entertainment applications
1An earlier version of this paper was pre-published on Arxiv [25]
4are being developed. Similar initiatives exist in the US in the
IEEE 1609 family of standards, in conjunction with the Society
of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
In contrast to routing in classical IT systems such as
the Internet, multicast and broadcast are the predominant
networking patterns in cITS [26]. These patterns are much
more suitable for the envisioned applications, which vary from
lane change warnings to cooperative adaptive cruise control
(CACC) and city-scale traffic flow optimization. CACC is
an application that has gained significant attention in recent
years, and is essentially an extension of adaptive cruise control
(ACC), where the safety distance between vehicles is reduced.
In CACC, vehicles periodically exchange position informa-
tion to form a very tight formation that would normally be
susceptible to collisions [10]. This is is a form of partially au-
tonomous driving that goes beyond the potential benefits from
sensor-equipped vehicles. The data exchanged between the
network participants, vehicles and infrastructure alike, share
the property that they are relevant to all receivers. Therefore,
addressing packets to specific vehicles does not make sense;
instead, addressing refers to the local neighborhood (1-hop
broadcast), specific regions (geocast) and infrastructure. This
style of addressing allows the network to exploit the simple
fact that wireless networks are a broadcast medium by nature.
These communication patterns are supported by two
message types in the European model: the periodic
cooperative awareness message (CAM) [27] and the event-
driven decentralized environmental notification message
(DENM) [28]. In the US, standardization foresees a two-part
basic safety message (BSM) [29], [30] that roughly corre-
sponds to the CAM and DENM. These message types make
up the bulk of communication between vehicles; in Europe,
additional message types are currently under standardization
for specific applications, such as the signal phase and time
(SPaT) and Topology Specification (TOPO) message types.
Both the CAM and the first BSM part consist of core elements
including position, heading, speed, steering wheel angle and
vehicle size. Supplemental information can be added, such as
vehicle role and status of vehicle lights. CACC applications
can technically work with just CAM/BSM.1 information, but
most proposals include acceleration information into beacon
messages for better performance.
The second BSM part is only transmitted when a specific
event occurs, similar to DENMs, but is packaged within the
next periodic BSM instead of being transmitted separately.
This second BSM part is also single-hop; unlike the Euro-
pean model, which specifically foresees DENMs as multi-
hop messages, events are transferred through 1-hop BSMs
only. DENMs are event triggered messages, which are de-
signed to warn about specific events, such as traffic jams,
emergency breaking, an approaching emergency vehicle, or
road construction. DENMs are usually relevant for specific
geographical area, and can be forwarded there over multiple
hops. A geobroadcast protocol is specified [31], which first
forwards messages to the designated target region and then
broadcasts the message within that region.
Although V2V communication using CAMs and DENMs
is able to support a large number of use cases, some use
cases require V2I communication. Infrastructure can help to
increase communication range during the initial deployment
phase, especially in critical areas such as intersections. An-
other important feature of infrastructure is that it enables
communication with back-end infrastructure and the general
Internet. This is useful for non-safety application classes, such
as infotainment services, over-the-air software updates and
security credential updates. RSUs can also be used to enable
specific applications, such as traffic and fuel management
through SPaT messages2. However, large-scale deployment
of roadside units is considered unlikely due to the estimated
deployment and operation costs of 3,000–5,000 US dollars per
RSU [32].
Complementary to RSUs, cellular communication can be
used to provide back-end and Internet connectivity, making
use of the fact that broadband cellular communication services
like long-term evolution (LTE) have already been deployed
on a large scale. However, the necessary developments to
support a large fleet of vehicles in addition to regular cell
phones have not yet been made, despite recent strides in
this area [5]. One of the major open question is related to
the business model; thus many assume that cellular support
will likely remain restricted to more expensive vehicles, at
least as long as cellular usage still incurs considerable fees.
New proposals from the area of 5G suggest that an ad-hoc-
like mode dedicated for inter-vehicle communication will also
be available in the form of LTE-V, which is inspired by
Device-to-Device communication (D2D) [33]. This approach
has significant backing from industry, but lacks fundamental
privacy guarantees in the same way that standard cellular com-
munication does. Independent of C-V2X, some have proposed
the use of a heterogeneous network in recent years, using
both IEEE 802.11p-based and cellular communication [34].
This approach can take advantage of both networks, but also
presents the challenge of efficiently managing the available
channels in a decentralized way [35]. Both heterogeneous net-
works and pure cellular proposals are still in research phases,
and will likely face many of the same security challenges as
IEEE 802.11p. Although our survey focuses primarily on the
IEEE 802.11p setting, we expect the results of many schemes
to transfer to C-V2X with limited modifications.
Beyond the communication model under standardization,
some authors propose that clustering might be a viable ap-
proach to organize the communication. Current standards do
not foresee this approach because it has significant disad-
vantages in terms of communication overhead to create and
maintain clusters [36]. These clusters are typically created
and maintained in an ad-hoc fashion, to facilitate deployment,
which requires vehicles to agree on one or more cluster heads
that manage a cluster. The disadvantage of this approach is
that it requires a fundamental inequality between different
vehicles to take advantage of clustering, i.e., the cluster heads
must have an authoritative status. Because this network model
security challenges that are widely different from the standard
cITS communication models, we do not address them in detail
2These messages inform incoming vehicles when the traffic light will turn
green, allowing more efficient fuel management.
5in this survey.
B. cITS Security
In order to mitigate possible attack vectors, security fea-
tures are actively considered by both academia and industry.
Standardization agencies have developed an initial standard for
practical implementation, which serves as the basis for a lot
of work in cITS security. Unlike traditional networks, though,
confidentiality is not considered a major requirement, because
most applications inherently rely on the data exchanged be-
tween vehicles. The main focus is instead to ensure integrity
and authenticity, for which standardization employs proactive
security mechanisms. The basic approach is to set up a PKIs
and provide each vehicle with an asymmetric key pair and a
certificate. The certificate contains the public key alongside a
number of cITS specific attributes (e.g., vehicle type, vehicle
dimensions, license plate number) and is signed by the key
issuing authority [37], [38], [39]. This serves as a long-term
identifier of a vehicle that confirms it as a valid participant
in the cITS. We first discuss the basic application of these
certificates for cITS security, before discussing proposals for
credential management in detail in Section III-C.
The ETSI TS 103 097 standard [40] in Europe and the
IEEE 1609.2 standard [41] in the US specify how certificates
should be used to achieve integrity and authenticity. The
basic idea is that each outgoing message is signed using the
sender’s secret key. The signature and certificate are both
attached to the message to enable broadcast authentication, i.e.,
each receiver can check message authenticity without further
message exchanges. For efficiency reasons, some authors have
proposed certificates could be omitted periodically to save
bandwidth [42], but this introduces additional delays beyond
those already present due to time needed for verification. In
both European and American standards, the cryptographic
algorithm is the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA), using the p-256 curve standardized by NIST [43].
This signature and certificate validation process provides
sender authenticity and message integrity, protecting against
attackers that transmit messages using commodity hardware
without key material.
While signature and certificates effectively thwart most at-
tacks using commodity hardware without key material, they do
not provide any guarantees on message correctness. Because of
the expected wide deployment of cITS and the long lifetime
of vehicles, it is likely that attackers either physically own
a vehicle or are otherwise able to extract key material from
(old) communication units. If key material is stored on a
regular storage medium (e.g., hard disk or flash memory),
attackers with physical access to a car could easily extract
it, transfer it to other devices, and create arbitrary messages
with valid signatures. Some propose to use trusted hardware,
usually in the form of a hardware security module, to protect
key material [37], [38]. Here, the idea is to store (secret) key
material within a tamper resistant component that is protected
against outside access. If a message needs to be signed, it
can be forwarded to the trusted device and the signature
is returned. Thus, the key material never leaves the trusted
hardware, making it much harder for an attacker to extract
secret keys and subsequently sign arbitrary messages. As in
normal PKIs, revocation can be employed to mitigate this
issue, but this raises new questions on how key material abuse
can be detected in existing vehicles.
Note that if key material is kept in trusted hardware, the
application code is still untrusted: it is likely that attackers
are able to manipulate the software in order to create arbitrary
messages. These messages will then be signed, because the
signing functionality running on trusted hardware has no way
to tell whether messages have been manipulated [44]. The
alternative would be to build an architecture in which all
hardware is trusted, but this also has a number of disad-
vantages. First, running all software on trusted hardware will
greatly increase cost, because more powerful trusted hardware
is needed. In addition, if all applications need to be manually
certified and deployed on trusted hardware within the vehicle,
over-the-air updates are more complicated and the deployment
process of new software is slowed down. Even if attackers
are not able to modify the software, they may be able to
modify sensor readings, which lead to modified messages as a
result. To alter sensor readings, attackers can either inject false
readings in the CAN bus or directly modify sensor hardware.
Therefore, it is likely that software running on the vehicle can
be controlled by a capable attacker, despite trusted hardware.
This requires us to consider correctly signed messages with
invalid contents circulating in the network.
C. Certificate Management & Privacy
If vehicles attach their long term certificates to all outgoing
messages, they can be tracked using a trace of received
messages with attached location information. For this reason,
long-term certificates can be replaced by short-term identifiers,
referred to as pseudonyms. These pseudonyms make it harder
to collect location traces of specific vehicles [38], [39], [45],
while still providing the same authenticity guarantees. While
pseudonyms enhance privacy, their parallel use enables poten-
tial attacks, often referred to as Sybil attacks [46]. This is one
of the classes of attacks that we will discuss extensively in this
survey (in section IV-A2), as it is one of the key challenges that
misbehavior detection helps address. However, in this section
we first present a discussion of some proposals for certificate
management.
A standard PKI only foresees the model as discussed above:
each entity has a valid certificate that identifies the entity, and
authenticity entails identification. For privacy reasons, many
proposals have been made to issue a set of pseudonyms,
which is typically linkable under certain conditions to the long-
term identifier of the entity [45]. The creation, distribution,
management and revocation of these pseudonyms present a
trade-off between privacy, security and performance. Two
major proposals are now in the initial stages of deployment,
which analogous to standardization of communication can
also be seen as a European and a US proposal. In the US
proposal, Brecht et al. [47] propose the use of butterfly keys
to provide a cryptographic link between different certificates.
In this model, pseudonyms are issued in bulk, revocation
6is done by revealing the butterfly key, and a misbehavior
authority interacts with the pseudonym issuing entities to
detect attacks in the back-end. Recent European proposals,
such as that suggested by Khodaei et al. [48], take an on-
demand approach to pseudonym issuing, and claim to have
more protection against Sybil attacks. Such protection can be
provided by limiting the validity of pseudonyms, which is a
trade-off against performance in the US model (where many
pseudonyms would be wasted due to batch issuing).
In general, these pseudonym issuance systems provide a
partial framework that in turn influences the suitability of
certain detection schemes. At the time of writing, it is still not
clear which exact scheme will be implemented world-wide,
or whether disparate systems will be used in different parts
of the world. However, the constraints posed by the credential
management system impacts potential detection mechanisms,
primarily through how easily Sybil attacks can be executed.
This aspect of pseudonym management is addressed in our
survey through a classification, as discussed in Section IV-D.
D. Attacks on cITS
Here we briefly review a number of proposed attacks on
the cITS, particularly those that can still be performed within
the scope of existing security mechanisms as described in the
previous subsections. These are divided along the lines of the
cyber and physical in a cyber-physical system; in this survey
we primarily focus on the cyber component.
1) Cyber attacks: The space of possible attacks on com-
puter systems is vast; in this survey, we concentrate on attacks
that are not easily avoidable through security mechanisms that
are already implemented. As there are many survey articles
discussing attacks [6], [23], [24], we here provide a review
of the important types and refer interested readers to other
surveys for a detailed review. The attacks we discuss here are
jamming attacks, data injection attacks, replay attacks, routing
attacks and Sybil attacks.
The jamming attack was already briefly introduced in Figure
1a. The attacker disrupts communication from or to specific
nodes by transmitting a constant or targeted burst communica-
tion to disrupt communication between nodes. This essentially
means that the attacker can decide which messages will arrive,
and which do not. This attack is commonly discussed in
CACC and can be executed even by low-power devices such
as UAVs [9].
Replay attacks, on the other hand, refer to an attacker
re-transmitting received messages. Standard proactive mech-
anisms provide some protection against replay attacks by
including a time stamp in every message. In cITS, a relatively
reliable source of timing is available in the form of a global
navigation satellite system (GNSS), which also provides high-
accuracy time synchronization [20]. However, in multi-hop
communication it is conceivable that these attacks can affect
throughput.
Replay attacks in multi-hop communication are closely
linked to routing misbehavior, a well-studied class of attacks
that aims to disrupt network performance. This category of
attacks originates from MANETs, and both attacks and defense
mechanisms have since been transferred to VANETs and
other types of ad-hoc networks, as discussed in Section II.
Basically, the attacker deviates from the routing protocol to
cause messages to be lost or be routed through a specific node.
Unlike most attacks we study, routing attacks do not directly
affect safety, and thus we consider these attacks to be of
limited importance. Note also that cITS includes infrastructure;
if available, using infrastructure by default for long-distance
communication significantly reduces the impact of routing
misbehavior.
Another important class of attacks is that of data injection;
in these kinds of attacks, an attacker claims information that
contradicts with real-world information. The purpose of such
an attack can be disrupting road traffic, or even triggering a
collision. For example, attackers may falsely claim that a road
is blocked to have the road for themselves, or they may claim
a vehicle is directly in front of a victim, causing the victim to
trigger the breaks. As suggested by these examples, attacks
have widely different goals, with varying time-sensitivity.
Because of the variety of attacks, many different mechanisms
to detect them have been proposed in the literature, and
a large chunk of misbehavior detection is directly related
to these attacks. Authors have shown [8], [11] that CACC
is particularly vulnerable to these attacks, and being able
to detect them is essential for the design of secure control
algorithms.
Sybil attacks [46] are a specific type of attack associated
with the pseudonym discussion above. In the simplest case,
an attacker here uses multiple identities to achieve a specific
goal. In cITS, this goal is often related to the application,
similar to data injection attacks: an attacker may use multiple
pseudonyms to make it appear as though the road is full, even
though it is not. Closely related to this are various types of
attacks on specific detection mechanisms, where the attacker
uses the identities to boost the reputation of specific vehicles,
or conversely reduce the reputation of legitimate vehicles (bad
mouthing attacks). A detailed discussion of reputation systems
and attacks on them was provided by Koutrouli et al. [49].
2) Physical attacks: Apart from the cyber component, there
are also many attacks possible on the physical processes
surrounding the vehicle itself. Recent work on the security
of controller area networks (CANs) [50], [51], which are the
primary type of bus used in current vehicles, has shown that
they are vulnerable to attacks. So far, this work has primarily
focused on attacking a vehicle from the outside; however, an
attacker attempting to attack the cITS could similarly exploit
their physical access to the bus. Such attacks allow an attacker
to force the on board unit to transmit arbitrary messages
that conform to the network specification without needing to
compromise the hardware security module.
Some authors have also suggested that physical attacks on
specific vehicles may be possible. This works by directing the
attack towards the sensors themselves [2]. A simple example
of such an attack would be taking a laser pointer and disrupting
the cameras of a nearby vehicle. In this survey we primarily
focus on attacks in the cyber space; however, we feel it
is important to also consider that physical sensors are not
necessarily immune to attacks.
7IV. MISBEHAVIOR IN CITS
In this section, we will go into more detail concerning
misbehavior in cITS. In particular, we discuss the attacker
model, different types of realistic attackers and a taxonomy
of misbehavior detection. As detection can be performed on
different scopes, we also briefly address this topic and the
closely related topics of misbehavior reporting and revocation.
Finally, we will go into the topic of pseudonyms, in order
to investigate the compatibility of the misbehavior detection
mechanisms with this privacy-enhancing mechanism. We will
use each of these aspects in our classification of the literature
in the next section.
A. Definition and Attacker Model
In this subsection, we will treat the definition of misbehavior
and the attacker model associated with it. We distinguish these
two concepts because misbehavior gives a strong intuitive
understanding of the ultimate goal of our work. The attacker
model aims to provide a more formal version of this intuition,
based on the state of the art.
1) Defining Misbehavior: In literature, there are many
different definitions of misbehavior [44], [37], [52], [53], [54],
often implicitly defined by the attacker model rather than
explicitly being stated alongside it. Misbehavior is a broad
term; its origins are somewhat unclear, but it is commonly
used for ad-hoc networks when discussing specific attacks
that are executed by the participating nodes, as opposed to
intrusions or attacks. Our definition of the term covers not
only attackers and malicious participants, but also faulty nodes.
Misbehaving nodes are thus any node that transmits erroneous
data that it should not transmit when the hard- and software
are behaving as expected. We argue that a misbehaving node
is the type of node we should detect. However, the literature
often distinguishes [7], [55], [38], [56] between faulty node
and malicious node, which are defined as follows:
Faulty nodes are those participants in the network that
produce incorrect or inaccurate data without malicious intent.
Faulty nodes are usually related to faults in sensors, either
because the sensor was damaged or because of errors caused
by variance in the sensor. Examples include a heat sensor that
is malfunctioning, causing the node to transmit the current
temperature to be -50 degrees Celcius, and the error caused
by a reading produced by a GPS device, which can cause
vehicles to transmit an erroneous position.
Malicious nodes or attacker nodes are those nodes that are
transmitting erroneous messages with malicious intent. Such
messages may also be referred to as deceptive messages, and
the attackers as deceptive attacks. These nodes are our main
target for detection, as they represent a direct threat to the
integrity of the data exchanged in the network. These nodes
can actively attempt to avoid detection, or subvert other nodes
in the network to transmit their erroneous messages. This
definition includes denial of service attacks and exclusion of
messages that should be sent (e.g., attacks on routing). The
goal, source and means of these nodes may vary greatly, as
discussed below.
Note that these definitions are not consistently used through-
out the literature; in our work, we use misbehavior detection
to refer to the detection of both faulty and malicious nodes.
Unlike traditional intrusion detection, misbehavior detection
attempts to detect incorrect packets, rather than detecting
malicious packets. There are many good reasons to avoid
a focus on content in a generic networking setting: unlike
in cITS, such networks see a lot of encrypted traffic and a
large variety of application layer protocols. In cITS, we have
relatively few protocols, and the public nature of transmitted
data implies that content is rarely encrypted. In addition, cITS
lack a clear system boundary, which is essential for effective
IDS deployment. Misbehavior detection can take advantage
of the public nature of data, and does not suffer from the
lack of a system boundary, making it a potentially more
suitable approach. This type of detection may not be feasible
for normal networks, but the characteristics shared between
cITS and cyber-physical systems (CPS) suggest some schemes
could be used in both systems.
2) Attacker Model: We now review several attacker models
that are used in the literature. The secondary purpose of
this section is to discuss the challenges involved with the
development of a good and universal attacker model for
cITS. Unlike most network scenarios, there is no universally
accepted attacker model that is consistently used for cITS; here
we provide a brief overview of the most common assumptions.
The attacker model from [37], one of the seminal works
on security in cITS, presents the following four classification
dimensions for attackers, and a variety of basic and sophis-
ticated attacks. We already discussed the distinction between
insider and outsider, i.e., whether or not the attacker possesses
valid credentials. The motivation of the attacker is classified
as either rational, where the attacker has a direct benefit from
his attack, and malicious, where an attacker only seeks to
disrupt or cause harm. The attacker may be active or passive,
which considers whether the attacker can transmit messages
or signals, or whether the attacker only eavesdrops on the
channel. For this survey, we seek to detect active attackers
only, as the very goal of misbehavior detection is to determine
whether certain messages or signals constitute undesirable
behavior; eavesdropping is not misbehavior, in the sense that
it cannot be detected. The final classification dimension is
the scope of the attack, which may be local or extended.
This distinction does not consider the amount of attacker-
controlled nodes, but rather their distribution over the network.
Local refers to one or more attackers distributed in a small
region, such as a highway section between two intersections
or a few neighboring intersections in an urban setting. The
extended scope provides for a number of attacker-controlled
nodes across a larger region.
Most attackers in this classification are instances of the
standard Dolev-Yao attacker model. However, the insider
attackers that behave according to the protocol, but send false
information are not covered in the attacker model. Similarly, as
discussed by the authors [37], Sybil attacks play a significant
role. In those attacks, attackers obtain multiple identities (mul-
tiple certified key-pairs) to circumvent reputation mechanisms.
Many authors of detection mechanisms implicitly or explicitly
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possession of a small set (usually 1-3) of valid pseudonyms
for each vehicle they control. Because this is usually done
through the PKI, there is a potential impact on privacy, which
many authors consider acceptable to guarantee safe operation
of the cITS.
One concern is that many authors [37] consider RSUs to
be fully trusted. We remark that although this may be the
case for connections leading outward through the RSUs, full
trust cannot be assumed for the devices themselves. As the
name implies, RSUs are deployed on the side of the road,
which makes them susceptible to physical attacks like sensor
tampering and differential power analysis, just like regular
vehicles. Because RSUs are potentially more authoritative,
they are potentially valuable targets if too much trust is placed
on them.
On the other hand, the full Dolev-Yao model, with the exten-
sions and limitations described above, is too strong to provide
a meaningful level of security. Particularly, if the attacker is
allowed to arbitrarily re-organize the packets received by each
individual node in the network (as in the Dolev-Yao model),
they can selectively deliver only those messages that confirm
the view presented by the attacker. In reality, the attacker is
also subject to the limitations of physics. For example, an
attacker cannot arbitrarily re-arrange the reception of messages
for each receiver in a wireless network. For this reason, the
literature specifies an important limitation compared to the
Dolev-Yao model: an attacker must be a node in the network,
restricted by the same physical properties that restrict a normal
node. Although their transmission range may be increased
through power control [57], attackers are considered to have
a limited physical presence [39]. In addition, it is commonly
assumed that attackers are constrained to physical limitations
such as the speed of light. Similarly, an attacker cannot in
general receive and jam a message at the same time without
the risk that some other receiver also successfully receives
the message. Another issue with the Dolev-Yao model is that
it is not designed for the analysis of attacks on application
semantics, i.e., message correctness is not considered, which
is the primary focus of misbehavior detection.
In the literature, some authors have attempted to formalize
these attacks and the effects on specific mechanisms using
game theory [58], [59]. These formalizations often make an
informal honest majority assumption, which assumes that a
majority of the nodes (or sometimes keys or messages) is
honest. The assumption is sometimes explicitly specified as
being about a local neighborhood or the entire network. A
local honest majority assumption is then the assumption that
more than half of the nodes in the direct communication range
of a vehicle is honest. This assumption is the most significant
limitation of some classes of detection mechanisms, which we
will discuss at length in this survey. Apart from this, we will
rely on terminology introduced by earlier work [37], [60], [39],
[61].
B. Scope of Detection
A first classification of detection mechanisms is by scope,
as show in Figure 2: local, cooperative and global detection.
Local detection refers to detection that checks internal con-
sistency, and optionally the vehicles’ sensors, as measures
for correctness. Cooperative detection relies on collaboration
between vehicles (and possibly some RSUs). Finally, global
detection refers to detection that occurs at least partially
with support from a back-end system. This terminology is
used throughout the literature describing the different mech-
anisms, although there is some disagreement regarding what
an attackers capabilities in a cooperative setting are (refer to
Section IV-A2 for more details).
Most detection mechanisms in the behavioral and plausibil-
ity classes operate purely locally, which makes them invariant
to Sybil attacks. However, this also makes it difficult to
identify the attacker, or even the attack, due to the low amount
of available information. Some consistency-based mechanisms
also operate locally, by comparing series of beacons from
several vehicles, exposing them to Sybil attacks, in exchange
for a much more fine-grained approach to detecting attacks.
On the other hand, there exist schemes that perform detec-
tion cooperatively: these are typically consistency- and trust-
based detection mechanisms. These detection mechanisms
often rely on an honest majority and exchange messages
between participants to detect inconsistencies or untrustworthy
participants. In particular the category of trust-based detection
is based on cooperation between nodes. Most schemes that op-
erate as a reputation mechanism also incorporate a mechanism
to perform reporting and/or revocation on the cooperative and
global level.
C. Taxonomy of Misbehavior Detection
We have designed a taxonomy to categorize mechanisms
detecting attacks within the attacker model discussed above,
consisting of two classification aspects and four classes, as
shown in Figure 3.
The first aspect we use for classification distinguishes
between node-centric and data-centric mechanisms, which has
regularly been used in the literature. For our purposes, node-
centric mechanisms are defined as mechanisms that primarily
concerned with the participants of the network. For exam-
ple, they can verify the forwarding behavior of a node by
analyzing packet frequencies, correctly formatted messages,
and so on to decide on its trustworthiness. Alternatively, they
are focused on the interaction between participants, verifying
their trustworthiness based on the correctness of previous
messages. Obviously the correctness needs to be tested some
other mechanism: those mechanisms are usually data-centric
in nature, meaning they use the content of the message to
determine its validity, independent of who transmitted the
message. Data-centric and node-centric misbehavior detection
are therefore mostly orthogonal, leading many authors to
propose combinations of both types.
The second aspect we use to classify misbehavior detection
mechanisms is the distinction between mechanisms that ana-
lyze messages from a single vehicle (autonomous) and mech-
anisms that attempt to deduce misbehavior from multiple ve-
hicles (collaborative). This distinction is best illustrated using
an example from a data-centric mechanism. Such mechanisms
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Fig. 2. Different scopes at which detection mechanisms can operate.
can analyze one or more messages from the same sender for
invalid behavior (autonomous), or they can compare messages
from different sources for consistency or deviations (collab-
orative) A significant advantage of autonomous detection is
that the mechanism will function independent of any attackers
that may be present, while collaborative mechanisms rely on
the fact that an honest majority exists. Note that autonomous
detection sometimes includes the use of the vehicles’ own
sensors (e.g., when determining the approximate source of a
radio transmission, or the relative position). Some consider
autonomous approaches combined with vehicular sensors to
be the only one that provides a reliable system. However, the
challenge with autonomous detection mechanisms is that they
are often imprecise, and cannot necessarily detect intelligent
attacks that use knowledge of the detection algorithm. This
imprecision is best exemplified by plausibility checks, such
as a limit on the claimed speed that is accepted; an intelligent
attack can always attack such checks by choosing values close
to the limit. To avoid a large number of false positives, the
limit on the accepted speed should be high enough to deal
with outliers (e.g., speeding vehicles), but low enough to detect
malicious behavior. If correctly employed, a set of plausibility
checks bounds the message space available to the attacker,
but also provides a space in which the attacker can choose
messages that will be considered valid. This resulting bound
can be used by employing collaborative mechanisms to pro-
vide a higher quality of detection than is possible using either
approach individually. Indeed, the field is progressing towards
these ideas, as evidenced by several detection mechanisms we
discuss in this survey. Having discussed these classifications,
we now describe the resulting four classes from Figure 3.
1) Node-centric Misbehavior Detection:
a) Behavioral: The first branch of node-centric detection
is behavioral. This type of detection exploits patterns in the
behavior of specific nodes at a protocol level. Information
considered by these mechanisms includes the amount of
messages transmitted by a node or the correctness of their
format. A core aspect of behavioral mechanisms is that their
analysis is focused on a node-basis and typically does not
node-centric behavioral trust-based
data-centric plausibility consistency
autonomous collaborative
Fig. 3. Taxonomy of misbehavior detection.
consider data semantics, as done by data-centric mechanisms.
An example of a behavioral misbehavior detection mechanism
is the concept of a Watchdog [16] that was introduced for the
security of routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. In a Watchdog,
each node monitors the network to verify that its neighbors
actually forward the messages they are supposed to forward.
b) Trust-based: The other branch of node-centric de-
tection is trust-based. Trust-based mechanisms exploit the
fact that many nodes in the network are honest, and that
infrastructure is available to remove malicious nodes. Trust-
based detection includes reputation systems, which rate node
behavior over time, but also voting schemes that allow vehicles
to vote on the correctness of information. Trust-based detection
can occur either locally or with infrastructural support. In the
latter case, issues regarding privacy are a serious concern,
which we address in Section IV-D. Trust-based detection often
relies on input from other detection mechanisms to update the
reputation of nodes in the network.
A core advantage of trust-based mechanisms is that they
simplify the revocation process. However, the ephemeral na-
ture of cITS poses additional challenges to trust-based mecha-
nisms, particularly when determining their initial trustworthi-
ness, as well as the information to update it. Data-centric de-
tection mechanisms or behavioral detection mechanisms may
be used for this: the trust-based detection mechanism is then
used to distinguish between legitimate and malicious behavior.
Both reputation- and voting-based mechanisms have to deal
with Sybil attacks [46], where an attacker abuses the reputation
mechanism by creating multiple identities. These attacks can
be used to either amplify an attack or exclude legitimate
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nodes from the network, and is one of the core research
challenges for trust-based misbehavior detection, especially in
combination with privacy requirements. Similarly, if an honest
node suddenly starts misbehaving (e.g., due to a faulty sensor),
this will not be detected quickly by reputation mechanisms.
2) Data-centric Misbehavior Detection:
a) Consistency: Consistency-based detection uses rela-
tions between packets, typically from multiple participants,
to determine the trustworthiness of newly received data. For
example, a consistency-based detection mechanism may con-
sider a previously computed average speed of vehicles on a
highway to judge newly received messages. Messages that
deviate from the average are inconsistent with the known
state and can thus be considered suspicious. Alternatively,
pairwise comparison of messages from different vehicles is
also considered consistency-based. Consistency-based detec-
tion has the advantage that only limited domain knowledge
is required to design reasonable schemes. However, a local
honest majority is often required to draw reliable conclusions:
if several colluding attackers surround a victim, consistency
might exclude information from legitimate vehicles.
b) Plausibility: Plausibility-based detection uses a spe-
cific underlying model of data in order to verify if the trans-
mitted information is consistent with this model. For example,
plausibility of movement can be verified from two subsequent
beacon messages by examining the distance traveled between
them and comparing it to the speed in these messages.
Plausibility-based typically allows for a very rudimentary
but fast analysis of received packets. It is performed by
considering packets from individual senders. The information
in the packet is either tested against a prediction of the model,
or the model is used to judge whether the information in the
packet is a plausible next step according to the model. Because
there is an underlying model, the mechanism can directly
express the plausibility of the message in a probability, which
can be input for further misbehavior detection mechanisms.
The models used for plausibility vary from narrowly defined
models like the laws of physics up to models that allow a
wide range of variation, such as a model that predicts driver
behavior. The narrowly defined models can be effectively
used to filter incoming packets for “impossible” messages that
can be discarded directly. A major advantage of plausibility-
based detection is that the mechanisms are always applicable,
even when an honest majority does not exist. A significant
disadvantage is that a model of the underlying data is required,
and the utility of the mechanism depends directly on how
accurate this model is.
D. Impact of Pseudonyms
As mentioned previously, pseudonym systems can have an
impact on the types of misbehavior detection that can be
performed. In particular, pseudonym schemes aim to hinder
linkability of different information items. Linkability is an
important aspect of many models used for misbehavior de-
tection, and sometimes even critical for safety applications.
We propose four simple classes that we will use to classify
detection mechanisms in our survey: full, explicit, implicit and
no linkability, which are briefly explained in the following.
For more details on the subtleties of pseudonyms, we refer
interested readers to a survey by Petit et al. [45].
a) Full linkability: means that all messages transmitted
by the same OBU can be linked, i.e., there is no pseudonym
change at all, and thus essentially no privacy. All possible
misbehavior detection mechanisms can be realized at this level
and some types of misbehavior detection even require this level
of linkability. Examples of such schemes include trust-based
approaches like OREN [62] and [63].
b) Explicit linkability: refers to any type of linkability
that allows direct access to an identity. This means that
linking is technically possible; however, there are several
ways to implement this. The issued certificate can either
contain the identity in an encrypted form, a direct mapping
from certificates to identity can be stored in the back-end,
or this mapping may be split across multiple entities through
organizational separation. Using each of these classes, it is
technically possible to link pseudonyms, but this capability is
limited by the pseudonym scheme.
Encrypting an identity in the certificate is an attractive
approach, because there are cryptographic schemes that enable
conditionally revealing this identity (e.g., PriPAYD [64], or
double spending prevention in electronic payment systems).
However, it is not clear whether this can also be applied
for misbehavior detection, especially if revealing the iden-
tity should happen locally. This system also requires that
detection mechanisms are standardized, and in most cases
part of the certification infrastructure, which is an unrealistic
assumption. Using a back-end mapping is a solid alternative
to this approach, in terms of implementation effort. Here, each
certification authority simply stores the relationship between
pseudonyms and real identities, revealing malicious users
as needed. This is particularly useful when combined with
direct back-end connectivity, either through RSUs or another
technology, such as UMTS or LTE. However, this requires full
trust in the back-end system, as it can revoke the privacy of
the users. Another advantage is that a back-end could perform
its’ own misbehavior detection, and exploit the significantly
higher computational power available to it. An example of
such a powerful scheme is [65]. A middle way between these
two types is organizational separation, which also stores the
link between two pseudonyms, but spreads the information
necessary to reveal a user across organizational boundaries.
VToken [66] and Butterfly Keys [67] are different proposals
that achieve this; overall it seems that industry and academia
both prefer organizational separation over purely technical
solutions. The core advantage is that the organizational sepa-
ration allows individual decisions on a case-by-case basis, if
needed. However, for misbehavior detection, this means that
linkability between pseudonyms cannot be achieved locally in
the vehicle, but only on an organizational level. The advantage
is that confirmed misbehavior can be acted upon immediately,
and some mechanisms may be able to detect attacks by
using a partial linking protocol to perform specific checks for
messages that are suspicious if the pseudonyms would belong
to the same identity (or vice-versa).
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c) Implicit linkability: or inference allows pseudonym
linking even when no mechanism for direct identification
or linking is available. There are three different sources of
information available for this purpose: certificates, message
content and signal properties during transmission. Using this
information, partial or complete identities may be derived,
although there is no guarantee that such a linking approach will
always be able to identify every vehicle. For example, certifi-
cates typically contain attributes of a vehicle, such as length,
height and color. These properties allow full identification of
unusual vehicles on the road, such as a yellow limousine, but
not the identification of several black vans of identical make.
Although this is an example of linking based on certificate
content, this type of limitation applies to all inference-based
linking, and while it can be bounded by combining different
types, it will have implications for misbehavior detection.
Secondly, implicit linkability does not fundamentally pro-
vide linkability through an identity, but through similarities
in messages. Implicit linkability only provides links between
messages, which will allow a receiving vehicle to create
’pseudo-identities’ for groups of pseudonyms that are consid-
ered to be the same vehicle. This makes it more challenging
to exchange information about particular vehicles with other
participants, and can also make it difficult to verify mis-
behavior and revoke the misbehaving vehicle. Nevertheless,
many misbehavior detectors will need to function under these
assumptions, as they provide the most realistic environment
in which individual vehicles have to perform misbehavior
detection (as opposed to detectors in the back-end). Examples
of inference-based systems include virtually all data-centric
security mechanisms. For signal-based inference, [68] and [69]
are good examples, while for inference on message content,
a good example is the Kalman filter [70], [71]. Inference
based on certificates is a relatively new idea that is some-
times captured within inference through messages, and is not
commonly considered because it conflicts with the assumption
that these certificates are intended to be pseudonymous or
anonymous towards other participants. Therefore, they are
typically assumed not to reveal this information, making such
detection mechanisms obsolete.
d) No linkability: is the idealized scenario in which it is
impossible to determine whether two messages originate from
the same or from distinct vehicles. Although this results in
maximum privacy, such a scenario makes it nearly impossible
to provide any working cITS applications, let alone securing
them. For example we can still attempt to perform misbehavior
detection on individual messages. The goal of such an analysis
is to detect unusual or inconsistent messages, which either
contain obviously incorrect values: this includes unrealistic
values (speeds of 500m/s) and values that do not match the
perceived scenario (speeds of 50m/s in a traffic jam). The
value of such detections is limited from a security point of
view, but filtering malicious packets may still be beneficial for
applications. Beyond that, not much more is possible: at this
level of linkability, the inability to detect Sybil attacks makes
it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to build a structured
detection mechanism. Unfortunately, this means that there is a
necessary trade-off between privacy as opposed to security
and functionality – necessarily, we are forced to sacrifice
theoretically perfect privacy in order to gain functionality
and security. However, we remark that even in this scenario,
tracking is possible by simply following a vehicle. Because
tracking vehicles by following them individually is unavoid-
able, it serves as a good baseline against which privacy can be
tested. However, detection schemes that require no linkability
at all will definitely not negatively impact the privacy of the
system.
V. STATE OF THE ART
In this section, we present state of the art mechanisms for
misbehavior detection in cITS, as structured by our taxonomy.
Although some mechanisms in this survey are designed for re-
lated types of ad-hoc networks, such as MANETs and wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), we will focus on cITS. Separate
surveys exist for these networks, though [72], [73], and we
will only use these as examples of how works for cITS evolved
from them. After discussing the individual mechanisms for our
state of the art, we provide a summarizing table of our analysis
in Section V-C. This summary will include the additional
parameters we discussed in Section IV; the scope of the
detection and its compatibility with pseudonyms.
A. Node-centric Mechanisms
The idea of node-centric detection mechanisms is to use
knowledge about the senders of messages in order to detect
malicious senders. Signatures are typically used to achieve
this goal, with certificates provided by a PKI (cf. Section III),
that allow identification of a messages’ sender. Once the
authenticity of a message sender is verified, it can be used
to correlate messages originating from the same sender and
thereupon analyze its behavior. Such analysis can include
whether the message frequency, headers and content are in
line with protocol specifications. Using past behavior, we can
then assign a trust value to information sources based on pre-
vious interaction with them. The assumption is that malicious
messages most frequently originate from information sources
that have misbehaved in the past.
In our taxonomy, we classify node-centric mechanisms as
either behavioral or trust-based. In earlier work for MANETs,
node-centric mechanisms are the most popular, because these
networks are focused on providing an abstract service to
network participants, as opposed to a set of services that
is inherently tied with data semantics, as in cITS. Node-
centric approaches can be further subdivided by their specific
approach; an overview of these approaches, with the example
mechanisms we discuss in this survey, are shown in Table I.
We explain these types, as well as exemplary mechanisms, in
the remainder of this section.
1) Behavioral mechanisms: Behavioral mechanisms are
focused on the behavior of a particular node. This mainly
concerns packet headers and meta-information like message
frequency. Behavioral schemes in cITS typically focus on
identifying nodes which send messages too frequently or nodes
which modify the message content in a way that does not
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Type Category Examples
Watchdogs Behavioral Hortelano et al. [74]
Flooding detection Behavioral Hamieh et al. [75], Puñal et al. [76]
Central Sybil detection Trust-based Chen et al. [77], P2DAP [78], and Footprint [79]
Node validation and reputation Trust-based LEAVE [52], OREN [62], SLEP/PRP [53], Sowattana et al. [80]
Decision logics Trust-based Raya et al. [81], Rawat et al. [63]
Event validation and consensus Trust-based PoR [82], z-smallest [83], Leinmüller et al. [84], CoE [85], Petit et al. [86]
TABLE I
NODE-CENTRIC DETECTION APPROACHES
adhere to protocol standards. As these attacks are not funda-
mentally different from attacks that some classes of network
intrusion detection mechanisms aim at, there are not many
cITS-specific schemes available. Behavioral mechanisms are
especially popular to protect networks where routing attacks
and fairness play an important role, such as MANETs. Some
of these misbehavior detection mechanisms have been adapted
to work in cITS scenarios.
Before discussing mechanisms specifically designed for
cITS, we take a brief historical perspective and discuss a
seminal work developed for MANETs [16]. This paper intro-
duces two tools for misbehavior detection: the Watchdog and
the Pathrater, which they evaluate for the multi-hop routing
mechanism called dynamic source routing (DSR). The essence
of the watchdog mechanism is that each node that participates
in routing monitors the network after forwarding a packet to
a next hop. This node can then overhear whether the next hop
forwards the packet or not, and therefore establish whether it
is correctly behaving as defined by the protocol (in this case,
DSR). Because a lossy channel might cause transmissions to
be lost, a Watchdog should be configured with a threshold
before it detects a node as malicious. Challenges for this
mechanism include loss or collision on the channel, as well
as false reports generated by malicious or colluding nodes.
The aspect of colluding nodes is discussed in more detail in
Section V-A2, where we discuss trust-based mechanisms that
deal with this issue.
a) Watchdogs: There are many proposals that adapt the
original Watchdog mechanism for specific requirements of
cITS, because they have the advantage that they are fully
independent of transported content. However, they can clearly
only be applied in settings where multi-hop communication
occurs (either through routing or flooding-style approaches).
One such work is that of Hortelano et al. [74], who set out to
evaluate the usefulness of the traditional Watchdog mechanism
for cITS. The core assumption is that routing is standardized,
and vehicles can predict the (expected) behavior of their
neighbors. To accommodate packet collisions and noise on
the wireless medium, the required number of re-broadcasts is
lowered by a certain threshold (called tolerance threshold), to
reduce the number of false positives, similar to the MANET
case. In addition, the importance of older results degrades
more quickly over time, to account for the increased mobility
(the authors call this devaluation). Once the watchdog detects
malicious behavior, it is logged in a local file, but reports are
not forwarded to other vehicles or a centralized instance. Their
evaluation shows that it is difficult to find a global threshold
for deciding at which point misbehavior should be detected;
setting this dynamically could lead to higher accuracy. In
addition, we note this paper does not address privacy in their
analysis, making the true suitability for cITS unclear at best.
As pointed out by the authors, several vulnerabilities remain;
additionally, there is no protection against Sybil attacks. We
note that in our more general attacker model, the attacker could
use selective jamming in addition to further amplify several
attacks.
b) Flooding detection: In addition to mechanisms that
are designed to detect attacks on routing, a very useful
mechanism involves the detection of a related type of attack:
flooding. Although Watchdogs are capable of detecting some
types of flooding, we create a separate category for detection
algorithms that detect other types of flooding, such as jamming
and MAC attacks. In contrast to Watchdogs, Hamieh et al. [75]
describe a detection mechanism for jamming attacks based
on detecting patterns in radio interference. The assumption
is that a jamming attacker behaves intelligently, in order
to gain an advantage through his jamming. This approach,
known as selective jamming, is a common technique to avoid
being easily detected due to constant jamming of the wireless
channel. The proposed approach makes use of the fact that a
selective jamming attacker will wait until regular transmissions
occur until they jam the wireless medium. Hence, a correlation
coefficient between correct reception time and time where
errors occur is calculated. If the correlation is high, that is,
if the medium is jammed most of the time when regular
reception should occur, the medium is considered jammed.
In order to achieve useful results, the authors took into
account realistic reception and error probabilities as a baseline.
Only if the correlation is unusually high, the medium can
be considered jammed. The proposed method is interesting
because the correlation can be passively calculated with a
simple formula, and because detection of selective jamming is
an important problem that is often neglected in security-related
works. A deeper discussion and classification of jamming
attacks is provided in a later work by Puñal et al. [76], which
discusses different types of jamming attacks and analyzes their
feasibility. In particular, they show some types of jammers are
capable enough to prevent communication altogether with high
probability, illustrating the necessity of jamming detection.
2) Trust-based mechanisms: Similar to behavioral mech-
anisms, many trust-based mechanisms for cITS are rooted in
mechanisms that were developed for MANETs. These partially
evolved from mechanisms such as the Watchdog [16], which
provide metrics to establish the trustworthiness of a node. To
aggregate this trust, distribute it among nodes, and provide
it to a back-end system, a mechanism is required that not
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only filters malicious nodes as quickly and efficiently as
possible, but also prevent attacks on the mechanism itself.
For example, Pathrater [16] aggregates the Watchdog results,
but it may be attacked through Sybil attacks (as the authors
also discuss). Core issues for trust-based mechanisms are
Sybil attacks on the one hand, and high mobility and brief
connectivity on the other. These challenges are much stronger
in cITS, as the connectivity between vehicles is sporadic,
and privacy requirements lead to a vehicle being allowed to
use multiple identities. This is especially significant when
conflicting information is received from two sources that are
either equally trustworthy, or both unknown up to this point, as
illustrated in Figure 4. To account for these challenges, authors
often propose the use of data-centric mechanism output, which
they then integrate into the trust-based mechanism; we will
discuss these approaches towards the end of this section. We
include these mechanisms here, because the primary focus is
the development of the trust management, and not the data-
centric detection process. There are also dedicated surveys for
trust schemes to be found in the literature, such as the work
by Rivas et al. [54].
a) RSU-supported Sybil attack detection: There are
many schemes that operate using a centralized authority to
detect Sybil nodes. The approaches we describe here are based
primarily on interactions between infrastructure and vehicle.
By grouping vehicles based on the RSUs they interact with, the
assumption is that the Sybils of an attacker will always follow
the same interaction path as the attacker. We describe several
of these schemes here, which are developed independently, but
have similar properties: trajectory signatures [77], P2DAP [78],
and Footprint [79].
[77] points out that Sybil nodes that originate from the same
vehicle will always have unrealistically similar trajectories
over time. With this observation, they design a protocol
to request special signatures, obtained from RSUs by each
vehicle, which can be used to build a trajectory. Whenever
determining trustworthiness, the identities with identical re-
cent trajectories are assumed to be the same vehicle, and
are combined into a single identity for this step, evening
out the effect of Sybil attacks. Although this approach is
theoretically appealing, it relies on a variety of assumptions
most significantly; a widespread deployment of RSUs, which
cannot be assumed everywhere, and full trust in all RSUs.
There is also the practical issue of bandwidth overhead versus
distinguishability; the larger the amount of signatures r , the
more expensive the protocol. This also potentially enables
denial of service attacks, because each request requires a much
larger response (i.e., the signatures). Next, some of the values
may be set to the value None for time slots in which no
signature was received from an RSU, which could be used to
cheat the protocol. Finally, any vehicle will completely lose
privacy if they want to prove that they are not Sybil nodes,
because they must reveal their position trace (i.e., the set of r
signatures).
In P2DAP, Zhou et al. [78] proposes a baseline to verify
all messages, which constitutes a relatively specific attack.
Whenever a triplet of time, location and event type is signed by
the same vehicle with different pseudonyms, it is considered an
attack. In order to prevent these attacks, the authors propose an
inherent linking between pseudonyms based on hash functions.
A semi-trusted RSUs is responsible for checking whether
an attack occurs using this linking, and reports it to the
central authority, which can resolve pseudonymity completely.
By using two classes of pseudonyms, the RSUs can only
determine that two pseudonyms belong to the same class
(called coarse-grained group), which corresponds to a vehicle,
and it cannot directly identify that vehicle. Although this
scheme provides relatively strong security in this setting, being
able to link arbitrary pseudonyms is a huge privacy issue.
Apart from that, the central authority has complete knowledge,
which is problematic. Another problem with this scheme is
that the event types, time and spatial granularity must be
standardized and require a single central authority, which is not
practical in a real world where border crossings are common.
Footprint [79] improves on Chen et al. [77]: it also exploits
central authorities by using similarity of trajectories, which
are generated using signed messages by RSUs that a vehicle
passes. In Footprint, these trajectories are cryptographically
protected, and consist of special signatures, requested by the
vehicle from the RSUs is has seen while driving. Footprint
works by bounding the potential set of valid distinct trajec-
tories an attacker can create. This bound is, in the worst
case, the power set of trajectories, but can be limited in size
using a test (which we do not discuss in detail here). The
authors assume that real trajectories are sufficiently distinct;
by forcing the attacker to obtain signatures through the RSUs,
the bound is created based on the real path of the attacker.
Then, when detecting Sybil attacks, all trajectories that are
suspiciously similar are considered as coming from the same
vehicle (referred to as a Sybil community). The authors use the
trajectories for every message as an authentication mechanism,
which allows any vehicle to compute the Sybil communi-
ties and avoid Sybil attacks. The signatures of RSUs are
time-dependent and unpredictable, which means that location
privacy is achieved against long term tracking. The other
disadvantages remain, however; wide RSU deployment is still
needed.
b) Node validation and Reputation: Following are multi-
ple papers specifically aiming at mechanisms that use explicit
voting. Here, voting is used to decide which nodes are (not)
trustworthy. These are distinct from consensus schemes, which
use identities to vote on whether or not a claimed event is true;
such schemes are discussed below. Voting mechanisms strictly
require protection against Sybil attacks, and those attacks are
thus usually not part of the attacker model.
Raya et al. [52] have also been among the first to present a
system for locally evicting nodes, including the possibility to
perform global revocation as a result using a protocol called
LEAVE. Here, vehicles exchange accusations about potential
attackers; as soon as a threshold is reached, a vehicle is
evicted temporarily. The set of accusations can be distributed
in an aggregated message, which can be used to immediately
ignore a vehicle, and used as a tool for global revocation
once it reaches the CA. A core advantage of this approach
compared to reputation systems is reduced detection latency,
because trust does not need to be built over time in LEAVE.
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Fig. 4. Example showing conflicting event notifications.
The authors argued that local eviction is especially suitable
for vehicular networks because of the low communication
overhead and quick reaction time to attacks compared to global
revocation. However, global revocation based on analysis of
the collected local reports is foreseen as an orthogonal coun-
termeasure against persistent attackers. Some disadvantages
of the scheme is that it may be vulnerable to Sybil attacks
and may have privacy issues, depending on the type and
implementation of the pseudonyms that are used.
Similarly, Zhuo et al. [53] aims to remove misbehaving in-
siders from the local neighborhood or the network. To achieve
this goal, two specific mechanisms are proposed: suicide-
based local eviction (SLEP) and permanent revocation (PRP).
As their names suggest, SLEP evicts attackers locally and
PRP achieves global revocation of misbehaving vehicles. Both
protocols can be applied even if pseudonym schemes are used
in order to preserve user privacy. The local eviction protocol
works using a so-called suicide mechanism, which is used to
discourage false accusations. The assumption is that vehicles
in the direct neighborhood of an attacker are able to detect
bogus messages, for instance, by comparing them to local
sensor information about the same event. If a vehicle detects
an attack, it broadcasts a message accusing the potential
attacker vehicle. Surrounding vehicles receiving the message
will henceforth ignore messages from the accused vehicle,
but they will also ignore further messages from the accusing
vehicle. To prevent multiple honest vehicles from committing
suicide in response to the same misbehavior, a random back-
off timer is employed before disseminating accusations. To
achieve global revocation, each vehicle periodically reports its
local blacklist of possible attackers to the back-end, which then
uses the trust level of each accuser to decide on revocation.
Unlike Raya et al., the authors specifically address the use
of pseudonyms, and SLEP relies on it to allow vehicles to
“re-join” the network after a successful accusation.
Raya et al. [87] and Bilogrevic et al. [58], [62] have pre-
sented closely related game-theoretic approaches to combine
their eviction scheme from [52] with a suicide mechanism sim-
ilar to that of Zhuo et al., combining the previous approaches.
Here, a suicide action results in immediate local revocation of
both accuser and accused, but vehicles have the alternative
to vote by transmitting an accusation, or abstain from the
protocol completely. Each course of action is associated with
a certain cost, where suicide has the highest cost. In addition,
cost values take into account the fact that abstaining from any
action for longer periods of time will leave the attacker more
time to do harm to the network. Using game theory, each
vehicle decides when and whether to take which action in
order to minimize the cost for all participants using a variety
of strategies.
Criticizing a number of existing revocation schemes includ-
ing the aforementioned papers, Liu et al.’s [59] goal is to
identify the limits of such schemes in vehicular networks. One
of the main points argued in the paper is that a local honest
majority, an assumption made by the revocation schemes
discussed so far, is not as likely as the previous authors argued.
If an attacker manages to create a local majority, she can
create false accusations and falsely remove honest vehicles
from the local communication network. If pseudonyms are
used to protect user privacy, the authors considered it feasible
for an attacker to use multiple pseudonyms in parallel to create
such a local majority. A general conclusion for all voting-
based schemes is thus that parallel use of multiple pseudonyms
should be prevented by the underlying pseudonym mechanism
used. Moreover, Liu criticized Raya et al.’s game-theoretic ap-
proach discussed above, arguing that the assumption that each
vehicle acts in it’s own interest might be flawed. The reasoning
is that the software running on the vehicles is not programmed
by the vehicle owner herself, but by the manufacturer. The
authors note that manufacturers may optimize their own cost,
which could invalidate the game-theoretic results that were
obtained by assuming that all vehicles optimize their individual
costs.
Sowattana et al. [80] discuss a voting-based Sybil detec-
tion scheme. This scheme has similarities with earlier wit-
ness/verifier schemes proposed by [69] among others. Similar
to those schemes, each receiver validates the validity of
received beacons by transmission range of those neighbors.
However, in contrast to earlier work, this scheme generates
trust on specific vehicles through a voting scheme based on
these results. The voting process is the focus of this work,
and the authors evaluate the performance of this scheme using
state-of-the-art methods. However, the voting process is itself
vulnerable to attacks, and those attacks are not analyzed in
this work. It remains to be seen whether the limited space
of positions for Sybils is sufficient to negate attacks on this
voting scheme. Privacy is not covered in this work at all, but
we assume pseudonyms are used to generate Sybils.
c) Decision logic: To establish the trustworthiness of
vehicles, which is used as input by the reputation mecha-
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nisms discussed above, authors often use a decision logic.
This is similar to traditional trust network approaches, which
are typically adopted for this purpose. Raya et al. [81]
present one such adaptation, which uses both data-centric
and node-centric information to establish trust in specific
nodes. However, the final decision is made by deciding on
the overall trustworthiness of a node, rather than deciding
the individual trustworthiness of messages. The authors used
a combination of three different factors to evaluate trust in
nodes. This includes default trustworthiness, which is based
on the type of certificate (e.g., police cars); event- or task-
specific trustworthiness, which matches the type of vehicle
to the event; and dynamic trustworthiness, which captures
message-specific information like proximity to the event. Once
each factor is computed, it is combined with the data-centric
information and only then does the decision logic decide
whether or not to trust the given node. The authors evaluated
a number of different decision logic implementations, but
stated that no single mechanism performs best in all simulated
configurations. However, the Dempster-Shafer inference [88],
[89] was identified as the most promising technique.
Similarly, Rawat et al. [63] present an approach using
Bayesian logic to predict the trustworthiness of vehicles. Basi-
cally, they compute the maliciousness probability for a vehicle
i for a time t given some observation Ot . Their approach relies
on Bayesian reasoning, i.e., computing P(Timalicious|Ot ) by
applying Bayes’ theorem. Unfortunately the authors do not
specify how they obtain the necessary conditional probabilities
(such as the probability of a message given previous observa-
tions). The scheme requires pre-configured knowledge on the
reception probability of a particular message. Another issue is
that the authors’ model does not forget: they always compute
probabilities over the entire observation history. They do point
out their detection threshold will change over time, but do not
specify how. In their evaluation, they contrast signal-to-noise
ratio with their computed trust values, based on a model of
signal-to-noise ratio over relative distance and receive power.
This makes computation of the associated probabilities easier:
if the claimed relative distance is falsified, their scheme can
reliably detect this based on their model. Their results are
difficult to generalize, and even for this specific use case rely
on a fixed transmission range for all nodes (including the
attackers).
d) Event validation and consensus: A common challenge
in trust-based mechanisms is the application of trust over
multiple hops. Event validation addresses this question by
allowing each vehicle to use their identity as a vote in support
of or against a specific event. Similarly, consensus mechanisms
do the same, but often relate more closely to data-centric
mechanisms (e.g., agreeing on specific data, rather than events,
or including data-centric detection results).
The work by Cao et al. [82] determine the correctness of
event reports through voting. The core contribution of the
paper is an efficient way to collect signatures from a sufficient
number of witnesses without causing too much bandwidth
overhead on the wireless channel. In the proposed scheme,
growth codes are used to achieve an efficient dissemination of
the witnesses’ signatures on the claimed events. Growth codes
are a type of erasure code, and are used to efficiently XOR
together signatures over an unreliable channel for efficient
collection. They are optimized to decode as many signatures as
quickly (in terms of transmission rounds) as possible; each of
these signatures certifies a claimed event, and only events with
many valid signatures are accepted as valid. Growth codes give
a relatively strong confidence, but introduce a significant delay
before convincing a receiver of the validity of the message,
because a threshold amount of signatures must be decoded
first. A strong criticism of this approach is that false negatives
may cause significant problems; if insufficient signatures are
received, events may be missed completely. In addition, the
attackers are assumed to have exactly one key pair each, which
means the scheme is not compatible with pseudonyms.
Hsiao et al. [83] present a similar approach to determine
whether a claimed event has actually occurred. In order to
prevent attacks, the senders collect a number of witnesses
for each possible event. For space efficiency purposes, z-
smallest probabilistic counting is used, reducing the required
amount of signatures that need to be attached to the message.
The idea of z-smallest is that, given n elements uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1, the z-smallest element gives
an approximation of n by calculating zc , where c is the
value of the z-smallest element. To protect against inflation,
where attackers increase the number of witnesses of an event,
each vehicle signs a hash of its vehicle id, the event type,
location segment, and time of the event. Only the z-smallest
signatures are kept with the aggregate, meaning it is hard for
the attacker to produce these z signatures (because the hash is
cryptographically secure). There is no deflation protection in
this scheme; the attacker can reduce the amount of signatures
attached to the message. The authors argue that an attacker
will only try to produce fake events; there are easier ways to
hide events that this mechanism cannot protect against anyway.
Similar to the previous paper, it is a hard requirement that
vehicles are restricted to exactly one pseudonym per time
period as the attacker model does not include Sybil attacks.
Leinmüller et al. designed, amongst other mechanisms, a co-
operative trust mechanism [84] to improve the results of their
mechanisms by exploiting trust developed between vehicles.
The goal of the mechanism is to defend against attacks per-
formed by static roadside attackers. This is done by combining
the data-centric minimum distance moved mechanisms with
transitive trust. Each vehicle evaluates locally whether sensor
information implies that the sender of a message has moved a
certain minimum distance. Then, each vehicle broadcasts the
collected information, indicating which neighbors passed the
local the minimum distance moved check. The assumption
is that if a vehicle A receives positive feedback about a
vehicle C from vehicle B and A has earlier identified B as
trustworthy, then A will also trust C without directly verifying
it. The scheme also incorporates neighbor information, which
is shared among vehicles using periodic messages (proactive),
although the authors also note that reactive mechanisms may
be possible. An honest majority assumption allows this mecha-
nism to work, but only when the attacker is (mostly) stationary,
which is a fairly weak attacker model.
The authors in [86] have proposed a scheme to build con-
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sensus about certain events in vehicular networks using a dy-
namic threshold for their consensus mechanism. The proposed
scheme collects a number of reports about the same event from
surrounding vehicles until a certain threshold of supporting
reports is passed, after which the message is considered to
be trustworthy. To cater for safety-relevant applications, the
authors took into account a maximum waiting time, before
which a decision must be reached. For instance, in case of
an accident warning message, the decision whether to trust
the warning must be made early enough, so that the vehicle
can still brake in time to avoid further collisions. A main
contribution of the authors is to implement the acceptance
threshold in a dynamic way. The threshold is adapted based
on factors like distance to the claimed event and number of
vehicles currently in the neighborhood. However, like most
consensus mechanisms, this approach suffers from potential
Sybil attacks. The dynamic threshold allows the mechanism
to deal with density variations on the road, but as the authors
also remark, selecting an appropriate initial value is still an
open challenge.
Kim et al. [85] combine several data-centric and node-
centric parameters of messages into a single curve, called the
certainty-of-event (CoE) curve. The validity of messages is
determined by checking messages against the vehicles’ own
sensors, messages from other vehicles, and, where available,
validation by infrastructure, making it a consensus mechanism.
This is combined with a relevance metric (i.e., whether the
vehicle will ever interact with the event): only relevant, valid
events are presented to the driver. Validity is defined using
a threshold curve, defining the required supporting evidence
(similar in functionality to Petit et al.’s dynamic threshold).
This allows for fast responses in emergencies with less cer-
tainty, while it reduces the false positives for events where
more evidence can be gathered over time. We note that the
CoE could be vulnerable to Sybil attacks, depending on the
implementation of the various sources of information that
are specified. In addition, this scheme is very difficult to
generalize to other types of applications, because specific
locations are required for events. The example application
the authors use, the emergency electronic break light (EEBL)
application, provides such locations, but it is unclear whether
the scheme can deal with multiple lanes and urban settings,
where there may be some uncertainty about the driver’s path.
However, the CoE is a powerful concept that can be employed
to allow for maximum certainty before warning the driver,
reducing false positive and negative rates.
B. Data-centric Mechanisms
In this section, we consider the different forms of data-
centric misbehavior detection that were identified in Sec-
tion IV-C. Recall that the core distinction between consistency
and plausibility is that consistency analyzes messages from
different senders, while plausibility verifies messages from
the same sender. Plausibility mechanisms include analyzing
physical layer signals to detect that they indeed come from
the same source. As before, we provide a brief overview of
this section in Table II.
1) Plausibility: Plausibility checks can be used to quickly
and efficiently filter packets that are malicious. Typically
simple instances of these mechanisms are assumed to exist by
node-centric schemes to provide a way to determine trustwor-
thiness of nodes. However, plausibility checks can also be used
as a more advanced tool to determine a numeric plausibility
value, rather than just filtering out bad packets. For example,
one can analyze the speed or location of a vehicle over time, a
receiver can identify its path and attempt to identify suspicious
paths. Plausibility checks are often used to detect attacks that
involve Sybil nodes. This relies on the fact that an attacker
generating these Sybil nodes transmits the associated messages
from approximately the same location.
a) Signal-based plausibility: One of the first applications
for data-centric misbehavior detection was the identification
of falsified positions by exploiting channel properties. By
detecting the source direction of the signal and using time-
of-flight, vehicles can attempt to verify the position contained
within a CAM. An overall challenge of these approaches is that
the error of measurements outside a controlled environment are
very high.
The authors of [68] provide a detailed analysis of Sybil
attack detection through analysis of physical layer properties.
They assume that antennas, gains and transmission powers are
fixed and known to all users of the cITS (except for the attack-
ers’). By applying signal models, they use the received signal
strength to determine the approximate distance to the sender
and apply this to verify the GPS position transmitted in each
beacon message. They show the theoretically possible areas
where an attacker can transmit to cause the receiver to observe
the desired received signal strength, in order to correspond to
the received signal strength. The authors also analyze the effect
of using different antenna models (bi-directional and omni-
directional) for the receiver. As the authors point out, they do
not consider special propagation models or GPS errors.
Similarly, [90] exploits the relation between location, time
and transmission duration for both beacons and event mes-
sages. Time of flight is used to verify the positions transmitted
by each sender, computing the time spent in the air by the
message. They assume light speed, i.e., t2 = t1 ∗ dist(li, t2,lj, t1 )c ,
with t1 as the claimed time of transmission, tj,t1 as the claimed
location of sender j and li,t2 as the location of receiver at the
time of reception t2. Although this approach is immune to
Sybil attacks, it does not compensate for GPS errors, MAC
delays or limited time synchronization between vehicles. The
authors also propose a post-event validation approach that
looks at messages from other vehicles to verify specific event
messages, which relies on correct positions using this time of
flight approach. Finally, we note that the authors consider a
pseudonym change after a claimed event is malicious, which is
detected through a lack of subsequent beacon messages from
the same source. This scheme is easily exploited to revoke
legitimate vehicles by an attacker with even limited jamming
capabilities.
Sun et al. [91] propose a vehicle tracking scheme based on
extended Kalman filters (EKF), a generalization of Kalman
filters for non-linear systems. The authors assume that EKFs
are used to combine angle of arrival (AoA) and Doppler
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Type Category Examples
Signal-based plausibility Plausibility Guette & Ducourthial [68], Ruj et al. [90], Xiao et al. [69],
Sun et al. [91], Yao et al. [57]
Multi-rule plausibility Plausibility Leinmüller et al. [92], PVN [55], VEBAS [93], Yan et al. [94]
Position prediction Plausibility Jaeger et al. [95], [71], Bißmeyer et al. [96], Barnwal et al. [97]
Vehicle dynamics Plausibility Yavvari et al. [98]
Post-event validation Plausibility Ghosh et al. [99]
Raw data comparison Consistency Bißmeyer et al. [100], Zaidi et al. [101], Grover et al. [102], Leinmüller et al. [92]
World modeling Consistency Golle et al. [103], Dietzel et al. [104], Bißmeyer et al. [65]
Rule mining Consistency VARM [105]
Machine learning on message contents Consistency Grover et al. [106], Ghaleb et al. [107]
Sensor sharing detection Consistency Yan et al. [108]
TABLE II
DATA-CENTRIC DETECTION APPROACHES (SOME PAPERS PROPOSE MORE THAN ONE TYPE).
Speed measurements of the received signal to estimate the
behavior of the sender. By combining this information with
the position information in the message, the estimation error
of the EKF will not diverge, unless the vehicle misbehaves
by transmitting false positions. This is detected by applying
a chi-square test to determine whether the n most recent
measurements reflect Gaussian behavior. When the chi-square
test detects a deviation, AoA and Doppler shift measurements
from neighbors are used to estimate the position, which is then
used to track the misbehaving vehicle despite the misbehavior.
The proposed scheme is discussed in highway scenarios only,
but can deal with any attacks, regardless of collaboration.
Privacy is not addressed in this work; however, we suspect
that the author’s system can be deployed to track pseudonyms,
while applying the work by Stübing et al. [70] to track vehicles
across pseudonyms.
Schäfer et al. [109] discuss how the Doppler effect can be
used to validate movement in an approach similar to those
discussed above. Although their work primarily focuses on
flying vehicles (e.g., airplanes), where distances are much
greater and thus signal propagation takes much more time.
Thus, they also briefly address the application of their results
to vehicular networks. Specifically, they describe that because
the required precision cannot be achieved in these networks
at reasonable cost, they conducted experiments that measure
Doppler Shift in sound. Despite encouraging results with an
equal error rate of zero, the authors state that approaches
based on their scheme have two fundamental limitations.
These are attacks from moving vehicles and attacks where
multiple antennas are used by the attacker. Moving vehicles
are unlikely due to the extreme velocities required, but multi-
antenna attackers remain an open issue, which is the case for
most schemes in this section.
Yao et al. [57] provide an extensive analysis of RSSI-based
schemes to detect Sybil attacks. First, the authors describe
an experimental setup that is used to make observations on
how RSSI measurements change over time, and how these
can be applied to detect attacks. Basically, the authors state
that one cannot directly apply RSSI measurements, and using
a propagation model to estimate validity of messages through
the RSSI is unlikely to provide reasonable results. However,
they also identify similarities between the RSSI of an attacker
and its Sybil nodes over time, and discuss the use of similarity
measures for these time series. In their work, they use the
dynamic time wrapping as a measure, which is particularly
suitable because it can deal with message loss. They also
include Z-score normalization of all RSSI time series to
prevent the attacker from simply using different power levels
for each Sybil node. Their work shows that even though RSSI
itself is considered unreliable, it can be used to identify attacks
when used as a time series. One weakness of this system is
that it breaks as soon as an attacker uses more than one radio.
b) Multi-rule plausibility: Another early idea was to
use several sources of information to verify message validity,
rather than just using signals to verify a position, which was
sketched in [110]. The authors introduce the concept to use
on-board vehicle sensor data and data from different layers
of the communication system to build a world model, with
which newly received information can be compared. Many
of these multi-rule mechanisms also include some form of
other detection mechanism, but often the focus lies on taking
advantage of the many fast and simple checks that can be
performed through plausibility checks.
Lo & Tsai [55] discuss a type of data injection attack called
the illusion attack, where the attacker injects false information
into the cITS. To protect against this attack, the authors pro-
pose a plausibility validation network (PVN), which consists
mainly of a checking module and a rule database. The rule
database contains a set of rules that govern whether certain
information should be considered valid or not, by analyzing
the individual message fields. The authors provide a list of
such rules to detect fake vehicles, which includes dropping of
duplicate messages, the position being in transmission range,
valid time stamps and others. The set of rules is different per
message type, and is default-deny (i.e., all rules must accept
the message). A weakness of this work is that it assumes
that the attacker can only manipulate messages indirectly
(i.e., through sensor manipulation, the attacker has no key
material). Because the rule database is shared amongst all
participants, the attacker can generate only valid messages to
avoid detection.
In [92], the authors discuss a variety of data-centric mecha-
nisms, including what they refer to as autonomous verification,
which is similar to the PVN from Lo & Tsai. These checks
were previously studied in [111]; we discuss the consistency
mechanisms in the next section. The checks introduced here
are called acceptance range threshold (ART), mobility grade
threshold (MGT) and maximum density threshold (MDT).
18
ART provides a very simple check that discards messages with
position claims that are far outside the communication range of
the receiver, and thus likely contain a falsified position. MGT
checks the distance moved between two beacons for suspi-
ciously high speeds. MDT examines the maximum amount
of vehicles in a particular area; when too many beacons are
sent from one area, the vehicle ignores further beacons from
the same area, in order to limit the impact of Sybil attacks. In
addition to these checks, the authors mention the possibility of
map-based verification and position claim overhearing. Map-
based verification assigns a plausibility value to the received
beacons by comparing the location to a road map. Position
claim overhearing can be applied in (geo)routing scenarios: by
comparing different overheard packets and their destinations,
overheard packets can provide indications of a false position
in the past. All of these checks do not perform particularly
well individually, as also discussed in [112], but the potential
for these checks lies in their efficiency, similar to the PVN.
Vehicle behavior analysis and Evaluation scheme (VEBAS),
was presented by Schmidt et al. [93] as an attempt to build
a full system up out of behavioral, plausibility and trust-
based mechanisms. VEBAS allows the local detection of
unusual vehicle behavior. Each vehicle analyzes all messages
received from neighboring vehicles to detect possible misbe-
havior. Schmidt et al. analyze the content of messages using
different modules. In this, most mechanisms are plausibility
checks, with either positive (meaning the mechanism states
the information is correct) or negative (information is false)
results. Some mechanisms analyze the behavior of a vehicle in
the classical sense (i.e., behavioral mechanisms) while other
mechanisms also make use of physical models. As an example
of behavior-based mechanisms, the authors used a maximum
beaconing frequency threshold. If a vehicle sends messages
with an unusually high frequency, the behavior can be regarded
as possible attack. The other mechanisms discussed by the
authors are plausibility-based mechanisms, some of which are
re-used from earlier work. Finally, the authors show a way to
combine the output of the different detection mechanisms, the
authors proposed to use the exponentially weighted moving av-
erage (EWMA) method. Here, older information is integrated
with less weight than fresh information, and different weight
can be given to different modules. This includes the possibility
to send and receive reports from other nodes in the network
(which adds a trust-based element to the mechanism): once
a vehicle has accumulated a defined amount of information
about surrounding node behavior, it will broadcast the results
within the 1-hop neighborhood. However, these recommen-
dation reports are not trusted blindly by receiving nodes to
prevent attackers from broadcasting fake positive behavior
reports.
Multi-rule plausibility has also been used to detect attacks
within cell- or cluster-based vehicular networks. Although
clustering itself has numerous disadvantages, verification ap-
proaches that analyze a leaders’ behavior often require data-
centric operation in order to exclude attacks. Yan et al. [94]
present one such scheme where attacks are largely prevented
by centralizing information at the leader. The leader is re-
sponsible for announcing its cell member’s positions, and the
authors design a scheme where leader and cell members verify
each other. The local verification primarily relies on a compar-
ison of GPS and radar measurements. For additional accuracy,
the authors introduce Sybil attack detection by using cosine
similarity and two alternative information sources that are
essentially consistency schemes. Finally, the authors include
a position prediction approach as one of their plausibility
rules. Nevertheless, the reliance on clustering makes this
scheme particularly poor for privacy, and potentially reduces
performance.
c) Position Prediction: As discussed in Section V-A2, the
advantages of node-based mechanisms are strengthened when
pseudonyms can be resolved, or at least linked, in the local
vicinity of a vehicle. Position prediction essentially uses such
techniques to predict behavior of vehicles and verify whether
they follow an expected pattern. Although the Kalman filter
is the most common approach, alternatives include the use of
particle filters, as discussed by Bißmeyer et al. [96], and zone
prediction, as discussed by Barnwal et al. [97].
The authors of [70] and [95] verify transmitted CAMs by
analyzing the sequence of messages to find the trajectory of
each vehicle. By tracking a vehicle using a Kalman filter,
they can verify the location contained within each CAM,
thereby allowing the detection and correction of falsified data
in CAMs. This works, because the Kalman filter allows the
accurate prediction of movement even under the influence
of errors (e.g., they are also used to correct errors in GPS
measurements). As a result, the Kalman filter allows vehicles
to locally link pseudonyms with high probability, and fea-
tures adjustment for errors and new vehicles. By defeating
pseudonyms in this way, vehicles can check that vehicles
are transmitting valid messages. Their scheme explicitly does
not distinguish between malicious and faulty nodes, instead
aiming to detect any misbehavior. We note that the existence of
Kalman filters does not imply that privacy is void – the Kalman
filter only provides accurate estimates when actually following
a vehicle (similar to physically following it by driving behind
it). The scheme was later extended [71] to deal with situations
where Kalman filter accuracy is poor, such as lane changes
and other special maneuvers. After computing the plausibility
of a CAM according to the Kalman filter associated with the
sender, they propose a scheme that probabilistically recognizes
the maneuvers of a vehicle using hidden Markov models. A
hidden Markov model is trained for each maneuver, classified
by the Baum-Welch algorithm, allowing the state of the hidden
Markov model to represent the different steps in the maneuver.
The information used for these models is then used to update
the Kalman filters where necessary. This entire process is
shown in detail in Figure 5.
d) Vehicle dynamics: Going beyond the position predic-
tion work, which often assume a static vehicle model that is
the same for every vehicle, Yavvari et al. [98] suggest that
prediction could be much more accurate. Their core idea is to
test the plausibility of new messages within the scope of old
messages using an accurate model of the vehicles’ dynamics.
This can then be used to construct bounding polygons that
describe the extremes of valid positions that could be obtained
given the vehicle dynamics and the previously received in-
19
Basic Checks
no
yes
Path Prediction
yes
no
New Vehicle Checks
no
yes
Maneuver Recognition
no
yes
yes no
neutralapprovederroneous
mobility data
and vehicle ID
check
passed?
known 
vehicle ID?
deviation
OK?
inside margin?
dynamic
maneuver?
instantiate
new tracker
adapt Kalman gain
calculate
Kalman prediction
calculate
Kalman correction
compare prediction
with mobility data
perform
threshold check
perform margin
check
query maneuver
recognition
re-calculate Kalman
correction & prediction
deviation
OK?
Start
yes
no
Fig. 5. Figure based on [71] explaining their detection method surrounding
usage and updating of Kalman filters.
formation. Because this process requires detailed knowledge
of the capabilities of each vehicle, the authors discuss how
to derive this from BSM information. In BSMs (in the US
model), there is detailed information about the dimensions of
each vehicle (with a resolution of 1cm). This can be used to
uniquely identify the vast majority of vehicle types, as shown
by the authors. Using this information allows for much tighter
bounds than an abstract vehicle dynamics model. Although this
design raises some privacy concerns, the resources required
to store or simulate the vehicle dynamics per vehicle type is
relatively limited, and the bounds on valid behavior are quite
tight.
e) Post-event detection: The idea of post-event detection
is that events are not isolated from each other, but typically
relate directly to future behavior. A good example of such
a scheme is the work by Ghosh et al. [99], who looked at
the post-crash notification (PCN) application. After sending a
PCN message, drivers normally adapt their behavior to avoid
the crash site; this is exploited here to confirm whether the
event was valid or not. Although this specific scheme uniquely
uses driver behavior for validation, other proposals have been
made that use subsequent beacons to verify whether an event
actually happened (e.g., Ruj et al. [90] above). In their scheme,
Ghosh et al. use a technique called root cause analysis to
detect which part of the event message was false. Although
lacking in privacy, this scheme is very useful to serve as a
baseline for revocation. Post-event detection suffers if driver
behavior models are unsuitable, and it notably cannot prevent
false information from reaching the driver, which may lead
to low user acceptance. However, for future cITS that rely
on increased autonomous driving, post-event detection may
be feasible, due to the fact that valid behavior is more well-
defined.
2) Consistency: Consistency-based mechanisms look at se-
quences of packets from distinct vehicles. These mechanisms
focus on detecting and resolving conflicting information to
achieve an accurate representation of the real world scenario.
They are often employed by secure aggregation mechanisms to
combine information from several vehicles into aggregates and
to deal with inaccuracies, which may occur when aggregation
mechanisms are used.
a) Raw data comparison: The simplest type of con-
sistency mechanism is direct comparison between message
contents to check them for conflicts. This is closely related
to consensus mechanisms from the node-centric mechanisms
section: the mechanisms here are distinguished by the fact
that a decision is mainly based on the data, rather than trust
(potentially derived from data) in vehicles. Unlike consensus
mechanisms, direct checking mechanisms often simply out-
put that a conflict exists (although some authors add some
trust mechanism to verify the effectiveness of their scheme
directly).
Leinmüller et al. [111], [92] describe a position verification
mechanism that bases on a number of different algorithms
(also called sensors), each of which attempts to detect mali-
cious or selfish behavior. The position verification mechanism
determines a trust value for each vehicle, but the focus of
the paper lies on the sensors. The authors propose sensors
based on either consistency or plausibility (called cooperative
and autonomous sensors respectively in the paper); we discuss
the consistency sensors here, and the plausibility sensors in
Section V-B1. The cooperative sensors are based on neighbor
tables and position beacons to avoid the requirement of
dedicated hardware. First, pro-active exchange of neighbor
tables can include positions or only include logical links
between nodes. In both cases, beacons are checked against
received neighbor tables by comparing the claimed positions
for a particular node in the beacon and the table. When the
tables do not include positions directly, nodes can extrapolate
information using the maximum transmission range (using
the accepted range threshold, see Section V-B1). Second,
reactive position requests can be used as a more bandwidth-
efficient sensor than periodic neighbor table exchange. These
requests are sent when an unknown vehicle M is encountered;
a vehicle knows the position of its neighbors, and selects
a subset of them as either rejector or acceptor, based on
whether the neighbor is in transmission range or not. It then
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Fig. 6. Figure based on [100] showing the different rectangles used to model
the vehicle in the presence of GPS errors.
sends its request to this subset of neighbors, asking for the
position of M . Neighbors that do not know M will respond
with a corresponding message; others will respond with a
position. The sender can then compare the responses with
the expected responses. Both of these mechanisms rely on
an honest majority, but are capable of dealing with noisy
sensor data for those honest nodes. The mechanisms can also
cope with network loss, allowing the mechanisms to cope with
limited attacks on lower layers.
In [100], the authors use consistency between CAM mes-
sages of vehicles to detect attacks. The authors claim that a
model typically used for crash avoidance systems can also be
used to determine likely attacks. The model describes that only
one vehicle can occupy a given space at a given time. This
allows detection of falsified position information. They assume
it is possible to uniquely identify vehicles despite the use of
pseudonyms (using the Kalman filter approach we discuss in
Section V-B1) and use this capability to determine whether
vehicles intersect. Intersection itself is measured using the
given width and length of a vehicle in a CAM. A mechanism
to deal with errors is also introduced, by simulating larger
rectangles outside the bounds of the vehicle, as shown in
Figure 6. The size of each of these is computed using the speed
of the vehicle. When detecting overlap of rectangles around
different vehicles, a degree of certainty corresponding to the
size of the rectangle is used. The higher this certainty, the
higher the probability that the position for one of two vehicles
was falsified. To compensate for lost packets, the authors also
discuss a prediction mechanism to predict the location from
which the next CAM is sent. To further increase detection
accuracy, the authors note that a history of received CAMs and
predictions can be used to compute a vehicles’ trustworthiness;
this trust value can then be used to decide which of two CAMs
is the correct one. This scheme is highly efficient in terms of
bandwidth, but the accuracy of the detection may be limited
due to the effects of noise in the sensors. Although Sybil
attacks are an issue for this work, the authors can deal with
some degree of packet loss as well.
Rather than comparing individual messages between vehi-
cles, Zaidi et al. [101] instead compare a single vehicles’ data
to the overall flow of all surrounding neighbors. The authors
propose to extend the beacon messages with three fields: flow,
average speed and density, which all vehicles must compute
and transmit regularly. Flow is a traffic research term that is
closely related to throughput; it is an indicator for congestion,
and the flow computation used in this paper is related to speed
and density. The idea is that if an attacker falsifies its data,
or uses Sybils to do so, there will be a significant difference
between computed flow from benign and malicious vehicles.
Whenever detection occurs, a vehicle is monitored for some
time; if the vehicle is marked as malicious (through hypothesis
testing), the vehicles data is rejected. This scheme has the
significant advantage that the proof of misbehavior is rigorous
(due to the hypothesis testing approach), but suffers from
attacks when the attacker slowly increases their value (and
those values of controlled Sybils). This attack is excluded by
the authors attacker model. Also note that this scheme only
works on a per-road basis (messages between different roads
will not verify, since they have different flow); this could be
resolved by including road identifiers.
Grover et al. [102] perform Sybil attack detection by
comparing neighbor tables of several vehicles over time. The
reasoning behind their work is that the fake identities of the
attacker must always be in the vicinity of the attacker in
order to be able to the necessary local majority the attacker
wants to achieve. Therefore, they must frequently appear in
the neighbor tables of legitimate vehicles as a group, while
legitimate vehicles will not form such a group over time.
Because network topology is highly dynamic in cITS, the
authors distinguish between uni-directional and bi-directional
communication links. We note that while the authors present
an effective way to limit Sybil attacks in duration, the commu-
nication overhead is significant, as is the latency for detection.
In addition, certain traffic scenarios cause the assumption of
recurrence to become unrealistic, e.g., in traffic jams, which
increases false positives or increases detection latency. Most
importantly, it does not protect against Sybil attacks that have
a short duration, which however may be sufficient to attack
a variety of information dissemination mechanisms, such as
traffic jam detectors.
[69] describes one of the earliest of such mechanisms,
verifying claimed positions using signal strength metrics. The
basic scheme consists of three roles: claimer, where a node
claims a position in a beacon, witness, where a node receives
a beacon and measures its proximity using the received signal
strength, which it transmits in subsequent beacons, and verifier,
which collects signal strength measurements to estimate and
verify the position of a node. To ensure that the scheme is
not subject to Sybil attacks, the authors design an improved
position verification scheme, which focus on the witnesses. In
this scheme, RSUs issue a signature of proximity at a specific
time, with a defined driving direction. By authenticating di-
rection, the authors can reliably establish which witnesses are
approaching vehicles, and only use these for detection. The
scheme does not account for scenarios with low amount of
witnesses, or one-way situations, but their statistical approach
that compares RSSI-based estimations with claimed positions
is theoretically sound. After classifying a neighbor as a Sybil
node, the vehicle will go through its neighbor table and verify
other neighbors in order to find other Sybils originating from
the same malicious entity. A final criticism is that this scheme
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assumes Sybil attacks are targeted; attacks aiming to confuse
approaching vehicles by issuing false witnesses continuously
are still possible.
b) World modeling: Rather than comparing raw data,
some authors suggest the more abstract approach of world
modeling. This removes the restriction of comparison between
specific messages, and rather allows queries such as “is this
world state consistent?” or “is this hypothesis true”? For
detection, these approaches often aim to find the data that
is the cause of a conflict in the consistency of the model.
Golle et al. [103] have presented the earliest example of
data-centric detection, which checks for consistency between
assertions (messages, also called observed events in the paper)
using some abstract model of the cITS. If this results in an in-
valid state, their system identifies possible explanations where
a subset of all assertions is valid – the best explanation can
then be chosen. The model relies on four core assumptions:
nodes can bind observations to received communication, they
can uniquely identify neighboring vehicles (that is, detect Sybil
attacks using physical properties), they can authenticate to
one another, and finally, the network graph should always be
connected. In case inconsistencies are found, Occam’s Razor
is applied, meaning that the explanation with the least amount
of attackers best explains the conflicts found. As an example
of how their model works, the authors introduce two models
that determine the correct locations of vehicles in the network.
Although this is one of the earliest works on data-centric
security mechanisms in cITS, the outline of their mechanism is
still used as a guideline for data-centric security and secure ag-
gregation schemes. Unfortunately, the detection component of
this work is not evaluated for feasibility, due to an assumption
that neighbors can immediately exchange derived information.
As the authors note, assuming this instant connectivity is not
very realistic, as the amount of data exchanged in their scheme
is quite high and available bandwidth in cITS is limited. In
addition, it seems to be assumed that the attacker is a protocol-
adhering participant, e.g., there are no attacks on routing or
on lower communication layers (such as selective jamming or
altered transmission power).
Data-centric security mechanisms have also been applied to
secure aggregation, as proposed by [104]. Aggregation is here
motivated as a means to make cITS more feasible. Due to high
potential bandwidth requirements, especially for traffic effi-
ciency applications that require information from large areas,
aggregation will be essential to efficiently disseminating infor-
mation through the cITS on a large scale. However, security is
an unresolved issue in aggregation: in particular, aggregation
aims to remove redundancy of information, which increases
the challenge of applying data-centric security mechanisms.
The authors specify a framework using fuzzy reasoning to
detect that an attack is in progress with high accuracy. As input
for this reasoning process, clues attached to each aggregate
are used, which are atomic, unaggregated observations signed
by their original senders. These clues provide the necessary
integrity that is typically hard to obtain in secure aggregation.
Using fuzzy logic to determine confidence in data, rather than
trust in nodes, is a main advantage of the scheme. The attacker
model in this paper considers an attacker that is specifically
aimed at compromising aggregation mechanisms, rather than
a general attacker that also exploits lower layer and Sybil
attacks.
In [65], the authors propose a more strongly centralized
approach. They require each node to detect incidents, and
forward them to a central authority that will detect misbehavior
based on these reports. Because the central authority only
needs to perform detection based on reports, rather than
continuously for all nodes, this provides a scalable approach.
In addition, this makes the assumption of an honest majority
reasonable, when combined with revocation. Each node as-
signs trust to all nodes it knows; confidence in this trust is
defined as a weight on the trust assigned by another node.
For example, if node a has neighbors b, c and assigns a high
trust to b, while b assigns a low trust to c, then confidence is
used to describe the amount of evidence each node has for its
trust assignment. These parameters are later used to determine
reputation of each node by the central authority. The central
authority can then resolve pseudonyms and determine whether
any node was cheating repeatedly, or whether there was a
benign fault. This is done by using the trust and confidence
of the suspect and reported nodes; attackers are detected by
determining which nodes have very low reputation.
c) Rule mining: Finally, some authors have proposed
mechanisms that use techniques from the field of data mining
to extract useful information from a large amount of stored
data, such as CAMs and DENMs. By extracting these rules,
the likelihood of the message being valid can be expressed.
VARM [105] is an example of this idea, which directly
applies data mining techniques to misbehavior detection. The
authors propose a data mining-based mechanism that dynami-
cally derives association rules from received data using a data-
structure called the Itemset-Tree. Association rules express
correlations in a data set, and are a basic concept in data
mining. By extracting these association rules, the node thus
infers information from received messages that represent the
expected behavior of senders. This knowledge can express
hidden information that represents local road conditions, with-
out the need to list all such scenarios and develop rules
or models for them by hand. Their core drawback is that
they may not generalize, because correlation does not imply
causation. Another issue is that the paper does not extensively
study the bandwidth requirements posed by their scheme,
nor is latency or detection rate the main target of the study.
We note that data mining is typically applied in scenarios
where latency and computational resources are not an issue,
and these techniques may not provide sufficient performance.
Nevertheless, the application of data mining is a novel idea that
can combine elements from both data-centric and behavioral
misbehavior detection; this work provides a good starting point
for applying data mining techniques to misbehavior detection.
VARM is considered to be a consistency-based misbehavior
detection mechanism because the authors specifically focus
on temporal relationships between events received from many
different vehicles, rather than verifying individual vehicles.
d) Machine learning: Grover et al. [106] have also pro-
posed a machine learning-based method to detect misbehaving
vehicles. Grover et al. have implemented several attacks on
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Fig. 7. Machine learning architecture proposed in [106].
routing and several attacks on message content, in particu-
lar a Sybil attack and position forging. They use machine
learning to learn the features of legitimate and misbehaving
messages, based on models of both. The authors defined
several features and used a network simulator to generate
traffic; the features of this traffic was used to train several
classification algorithms. There are two classes of features –
one used for detecting position falsification and Sybil attacks
(similar to many data-centric mechanisms) and one class that
considers various temporal aspects and delivery ratios. The
generated network traffic was created using a two-way, multi-
lane highway scenario. The authors used the values for each
of these features as input for several classification algorithms
from machine learning, contained in the WEKA toolset [113].
The best results were obtained using the Random Forest [114]
and J48 algorithms. Figure 7 shows the overall architecture of
the proposed mechanism. In a later paper [115], they improved
on their previous work by replacing the single classification
algorithm with a number of classification algorithms. After
classification by each of the algorithms, a majority decision is
used to decide whether a given situation is considered part of
an attack. In both papers, specific implementations of attacks
are used to evaluate the system; these implementations are
used to generate data for both the training and testing set. Both
of these works rely on specific implementations of attacks
and a specific scenario; in particular, no details are provided
regarding attack implementation and the base scenario. It is
thus difficult to determine whether these classifiers provide
a general solution, or a solution specific to the scenario,
since it is unknown how real-world behavior compares to the
simulated legitimate behavior.
Ghaleb et al. [107] propose a similar approach to
Grover et al., using neural networks. The authors describe
how vehicles collect information from their environment using
sensors, which is then shared through communication (i.e.,
through V2V communication). This information is then used to
construct a local dynamic map (LDM) of a vehicle, from which
features for misbehavior detection can be derived. Historical
values of these features are used to construct a model, which
is then used in an on-line fashion to classify new messages
into legitimate and malicious. In their work, features include
a variety of plausibility and consistency checks that they cite
from previous work, as well as some own features. The authors
use a simulated set of misbehavior to create a supervised
learning problem, to which they apply their neural network,
which is a standard feed-forward back-propagation network
with 7 input neurons and 15 neurons in one hidden layer. The
output layer is not described, but can be assumed to have a
single neuron (i.e., misbehavior or not). The evaluation of this
work has significant weaknesses, including a communication
model far behind the state of the art and no details on the
implemented attacks. The authors also use the entire dataset
for training, before using four vehicles from this dataset for
testing (which is methodologically unsound). Results were
compared to earlier work, whose results correspond to some
of the features proposed in the feature collection (it is not
clearly stated which of the work they compare to, as they
reference multiple papers). Collecting the data necessary to
build a model for wide-spread, static deployment requires a
lot of resources, and the resulting model could easily be used
by an attacker to search for messages that will be accepted by
a receiver. However, the approach described by the authors is
easy to generalize to other areas where appropriate data and
features are available.
The authors in [108] focus on discussing the verification of
location data by using additional vehicle sensors that allow
detection by line-of-sight, so-called eye-devices, in order to
verify received messages (which are referred to as coming
from ear-devices). The authors propose that each vehicle
should have a variety of radars and cameras to detect other
vehicles. It is assumed that 85% of all vehicles is honest, and
that global positioning system (GPS) data can be trusted if the
information corresponds to the own location combined with
the data from eye-devices. However, eye-devices only work
for line-of-sight; thus, the authors allow vehicles to request
eye-device confirmation from vehicles on the oncoming traffic.
Similarly, neighbors can be queried, although oncoming traffic
is preferred. The authors express the eye data through vectors
relative to the current vehicle (for speed and location). The
authors then go on to define local security as verification by
checking against local sensors, including ear-devices (mes-
sages from different vehicles). The authors claim that local
security can be used to obtain global security, reasoning that
this is analogous to greedy algorithms. However, we note
that greedy algorithms are heuristics, which by definition do
not necessarily provide a global solution. As the paper lacks
any further proof of a globally optimal solution, it is likely
that their mechanism can achieve at best a local solution. In
addition, the authors do not seem to consider errors in the
obtained locations and other sensor data, further weakening
their claim. Finally, in low density scenarios the attacker may
be able to exploit the mechanism to cause false detections
using specially crafted messages, although this is a fairly
obscure scenario.
C. Overview
Now that we have provided an overview of different types
of mechanisms that exist in the literature, we summarize these
mechanisms and their properties in Tables III and IV. These
tables contain the most important pros and cons for each
mechanism, as well as a qualitative analysis of the scope of
detection, required resources (which includes computational
and communication resources), generalizability, security and
impact on privacy. The scope of detection tells us whether a
mechanism performs local (L), cooperative (C) or back-end
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(B) detection, connecting back to the discussion on detection
scopes in Section IV-B. The required resources field in the
table gives an intuition of how much bandwidth, computational
resources and memory is required; highly efficient mechanisms
are marked with , while expensive mechanisms are marked
with . Good generalizability ( ) means that the mechanism
may be transferred and applied to other domains relatively
easily, a topic we discuss in detail in Section VI-C. With the
security column, we illustrate how easily a mechanism can be
manipulated: a mechanism subject to certain attacks is marked
with , while a mechanism with a limited attacker model
(compared to the model discussed in Section IV-A2) is marked
with and a good scheme is marked with . Note that this
security column does not take into consideration the detection
accuracy, but only the security of the detection mechanism.
The last column, privacy, indicates the necessary type of
linkability, as discussed in Section IV-D; full linkability (F),
explicit linkability (E), implicit linkability (I) or no linkability
(N). When the issue is not addressed in the paper, we use a
question mark.
VI. SOLVED AND OPEN CHALLENGES
Starting with an overview of the current cITS ecosystem,
as well as ongoing standardization efforts, we have provided
an extensive categorization of different misbehavior detection
mechanisms. In this section we discuss the solved and open
challenges for security in cITS. In addition, we provide a
discussion of ways to transfer the security mechanisms to other
fields.
A. Reoccurring patterns
In our discussion of the mechanisms, we often pointed out
potential attacks tied to other challenges, which are solved
by different mechanisms. Indeed, many mechanisms in our
discussion are complementary, and here we discuss several
recurring patterns of approaches taken by these mechanisms.
a) Physical models: A number of mechanisms use phys-
ical models to detect misbehavior [92], [100]. These models
allow a detection mechanism to incorporate specific knowl-
edge about the driving process of vehicles. The complexity
of models ranges from very simple to very complex models.
An example of a simple model is that cars cannot drive faster
than 500 km/h, or that two cars cannot occupy the exact same
position. Complex models include an analysis of acceleration
and deceleration behavior, movement prediction including turn
probabilities, correlation of vehicle positions to street maps
and predictions based on vehicle dynamics [91]. Sensors are
often used as a base truth by the observing vehicle; it remains
to be investigated whether attacks can be designed that affect
sensors and messages simultaneously in a consistent way.
Regardless, the correlation with models is a very interesting
approach, because it often works locally and does not depend
on correlation of data from several vehicles (which is also
a common attack vector). Therefore, detection components
based on physical models should be included in a misbehavior
detection system.
b) Signal properties: Besides physical models targeted at
the process of driving itself, physical properties of the wireless
channel (i.e., signal properties) are another important tool for
detection of spurious messages. The typical wireless reception
range can be estimated, and moreover, WiFi hardware is
able to measure the strength of a received signal. When
vehicles synchronize their clocks with GPS, time of flight
measurements can also be used. All these observations can be
used to detect messages which are, for instance, received with
a high signal strength but claim to originate from a position
far away. In addition, there have been proposals to include
additional hardware (typically additional antennae, see [117])
to effectively perform more advanced signal analysis to deter-
mine the direction from which the signal originates. However,
the effectiveness of signal-based mechanisms is somewhat
disputed due to the high mobility, cost constraints and po-
tential inaccuracy [111], [68]. This will be especially chal-
lenging when combined with newly proposed MAC-protocols
that exploit the additional spatial re-use enabled by transmit
power variations, such as decentralized congestion control in
ETSI [118]. Although some proposals [57] address this issue
by looking at signals over time, this increases the detection
latency.
c) Machine learning techniques: A problem that many
mechanisms face is how to interpret locally collected data in
order to find patterns, or how to merge results from a set
of different misbehavior detectors into one coherent output.
To solve these problems, a number of schemes adapt ideas
from machine learning. Often-employed approaches include
decision trees, Bayesian inference or Dempster-Shafer the-
ory [81], [63], [105]. These approaches can provide useful
tools to analyze data and derive certain interesting features
that might point at attacks. Some reputation systems, such
as those proposed in [58], already use some of these ideas
to manage node reputation, but these typically only focus on
node-centric aspects, such as how to maintain the reputation
system and how to protect it against attacks. In addition
to providing misbehavior detection for vehicles, these node-
centric approaches may be later used to perform an after-the-
fact analysis, which in turn can be used to verify detected
misbehavior. This is essentially the idea behind various data-
centric machine learning approaches, where a large volume of
data is labeled and used to learn a classifier. For this latter
case, collecting labeled data that is sufficiently diverse is a
huge challenge.
d) Centralized detection: Early works often perform the
whole process of misbehavior detection locally and only send
reports about local decisions to the back-end to perform
pseudonym resolution and revocation. In these works, the
back-end does not perform any detection task; rather, it just
verifies received reports for correctness and checks for false
accusations. However, performing detection exclusively in a
local fashion prevents the detection mechanism from detecting
larger clusters of distributed misbehavior. For instance, an
attacker could repeatedly mount attacks at different locations,
which might be detected locally, but only in correlation show
the full extend of the attacks’ severity. Hence, newer schemes
include the back-end more and more in the actual detection
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TABLE III
MECHANISMS OVERVIEW
Mechanism Pros Cons
Scope
R
esources
G
eneralizability
Security
Privacy ∑
Node-centric / behavioral (Section V-A1)
Watchdogs [74] Low implementation complexity Only detects malevolent forwarding,
vulnerable to attacks
L ?
Jamming
detection [75], [76]
Detects adaptive jamming No attacker identification L N
Node-centric / trust-based (Section V-A2)
Urban path-based [77] fast, computationally efficient detection infrastructure-dependent, privacy is-
sues, vulnerabilities and false positives
C ?
P2DAP [78] Strong detection/attacker model; poten-
tially efficient approach
Infrastructure dependent; no privacy to
central authority
B E
Footprint [79] Reasonable level of privacy without
high cost; useful for authenticating
events
infrastructure-dependent; geared only
towards Urban networks; full trust in
RSUs; potential false positives
C E,I
LEAVE [52] Aggregation improves the quality of
detection and reduces latency
Mechanism is prone to Sybil attacks C ?
OREN [62], [58] [87] Game-theoretic evidence, integrates is-
suance of pseudonyms as incentive sys-
tem, pseudonyms are not linkable
Prone to Sybil attacks by financially
capable attackers
B N
SLEP & PRP [53] Holistic approach, integrating coopera-
tive and back-end detection
Potentially prone to Sybil attacks B E
Sowattana et al. [80] Improves ideas from earlier work Voting is prone to Sybil attacks, expen-
sive neighbor table exchange
C E
Decision logics [81] Can reuse results of the mechanisms No optimal decision logic L E
Bayesian
logic-based [63]
Suspiciousness instead of trust Misclassification of unusual events L E
PoR [82], [116] Simple and relatively efficient Decoding issues for new nodes, weak
attacker model
C,B F
Z-smallest
probabilistic
counting [83]
Protection against inflation attacks,
bandwidth efficient broadcast
Enforces a specific message format,
weak attacker model
C E,I
Cooperative trust
building [84]
Builds on simple schemes, trust transi-
tivity for improved performance
Bandwidth requirements not considered C ?
Dynamic threshold
trustworthiness [86]
Maximizes the confidence in messages
until response is required
Potentially vulnerable to targeted at-
tacks exploiting the mechanism
C ?
Certainty of
Event [85]
Intuitive representation, combines secu-
rity and safety aspects
Highly application-specific, relies on
verified positions
C E
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TABLE IV
MECHANISMS OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)
Mechanism Pros Cons
Scope
R
esources
G
eneralizability
Security
Privacy ∑
Data-centric / plausibility (Section V-B1)
Signal Analysis [68] Thorough analysis of RSSI-based estima-
tion
Potentially infeasible with GPS errors L N
Transmission
time-based [90]
Useful for specific events Unrealistic assumptions for position ver-
ification, vulnerable to attacks
L,C E
EKF with AoA and
DS [91]
Efficient tracking of malicious vehicles Additional hardware required, relies on
privacy breach
L E
RSSI voiceprint [57] Linking Sybil nodes through physical
characteristics
Attacker may only use one radio L I
[92], [111] and [112] Efficient Limited detection capabilities L I/N
PVN [55] Fast and efficient, allows relations be-
tween plausibility checks
Insufficient as the only means to detect
attacks
L I
VEBAS [93] Self-sufficiency of mechanisms Honest majority assumption L,C F
Kalman
filter-based [70], [71],
[95]
Highly efficient tracking of vehicles Computationally expensive, relies on par-
tial privacy breach
L I
Prediction based on
vehicle dynamics [98]
Excellent performance Ease of tracking and potentillay large
database
L E
After-the-fact
verification [99]
Highly useful for reporting No preemptive detection, each applica-
tion requires accurate predictions
L ?
work. Notably [65] and [78] employ such centralized detection
approaches. A challenge to solve in this context is the level of
event reporting. In order to allow the back-end to detect more
attacks than possible locally, it may be necessary to report
more data to the back-end, including even mildly suspicious
behavior, to provide a large enough data basis for centralized
detection.
B. Open Issues
Even though many specific aspects of misbehavior have
been addressed, there are still a number of open issues. We
discuss these issues based on our survey of the state of the
art and the mechanisms discussed in Section V. These issues
are challenges regarding the detection itself – dealing with
conflicting data, for instance by discarding or hiding messages,
error correction, reporting and so forth is an orthogonal issue.
a) Thresholds for detection: An important problem in
any intrusion detection system is its configuration; after which
threshold is a message malicious? This question is also an
important challenge in misbehavior detection, because high
false positive or false negative rates can cause significant
problems or even cause the system to be rejected entirely. Es-
pecially for cITS, where direct reporting to an expert through
warnings is not always possible, this needs to be addressed. As
a related issue, the distinction between erroneous and explicitly
malicious messages would be useful, although this may not
be feasible. Additionally, because of the data-centric nature of
many detection mechanisms, the question of when information
should be merged is significant, and this may affect detection
performance directly.
b) Identification of misbehaving nodes: We note that
while data-centric mechanisms are superior at detecting con-
flicting data and identifying which data is malicious, they may
not be able to identify the attacker directly. Although for many
applications, it is more important to have accurate data than
it is to identify attackers to mitigate possible harm through
attacks, node-centric mechanisms that identify attackers are
still useful. They can be used to perform local or global
revocation, thereby limiting both the amount of attackers in
the network and the impact they may have on the network. As
an example take the fake traffic jam scenario from Figure 1b.
Although a data-centric mechanism may detect that the re-
ported traffic jam is fake, without proper identification of the
sender, a local revocation is not feasible. Finally, identifying
which data belongs to which vehicle may provide additional
input for node-centric mechanisms, for instance to assign a
credibility to information sources.
c) Voting, pseudonyms and Sybil attacks: Many node-
centric mechanisms rely on long-term identities to perform
voting or other trust-based evaluation of data. The basic idea is
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TABLE V
MECHANISMS OVERVIEW (CONTINUED)
Mechanism Pros Cons
Scope
R
esources
G
eneralizability
Security
Privacy ∑
Data-centric / consistency (Section V-B2)
Overlap
detection [100]
Good detection results under reasonable
assumptions
Requires fixed transmission power C I
Abnormal flow
detection [101]
Novel idea that applies traffic research
knowledge
Constrained to specific roads, vulnerable
to gradual change
L N
Neighbor-sets over
time [102]
Novel ideas, prevents long-term Sybil at-
tacks
False positives possible; no prevention
for short-term Sybil attacks
C ?
Enhanced Position
Verification [69]
Works well in ideal situations Depends on infrastructure & network
properties, vulnerabilities
L(,C) ?
Proactive cooperative
sensors in [92]
Simplicity, capable of dealing with noisy
data, powerful in dense scenarios
Vulnerable to Sybil attacks, high band-
width cost
C ?
Reactive cooperative
sensors in [92]
Simplicity, capable of dealing with noisy
data
Unreliable detection, requires unicast
message exchange
C ?
Attacker
modeling [103]
Structured and general approach Requires complex reasoning techniques
on every vehicle
C I
Resilient secure
aggregation [104]
Efficient approach to secure aggregation only works for aggregation purposes C ?
Back-end
detection [65]
Uses global knowledge to
improve/confirm detection
Potential privacy concerns; potential high
cost at the back-end
B E
VARM [105] Novel approach, based on well-
researched area
Feasibility and mapping of rules to con-
clusions is unclear
L ?
Machine-
learning [106] [115]
Machine learning allows easy generaliza-
tion
Prone to gradual changing from attacks,
decisions not transparent
L ?
Neural
Networks [107]
Generalizability Fixed model, weak evaluation, privacy
unclear
L,B ?
Active position
detection [108]
Dedicated hardware for secure position-
ing is highly effective
Hardware requirements, no privacy, vul-
nerable to Sybil attacks
C ?
simple: assuming that an event, such as an icy road, is detected
by all passing vehicles and further assuming that the majority
of vehicles is honest, a simple majority vote about whether
the road is actually icy should reveal possible misbehavior.
However, it is a common assumption that vehicles will
use short-term pseudonyms for communication to protect
privacy, as discussed in Section III-C. Therefore, an important
open issue is to build a scheme that performs voting using
pseudonyms, while still providing the necessary resilience
against Sybil attacks. A simple solution would be to require
that a vehicle can only use one pseudonym at a time, but this
assumption is disputable both from a practical and a privacy
point of view. Although some work has already been done
(see Section V-A2), it is an open challenge to design a voting
scheme where all participants can use arbitrary pseudonyms
while still allowing to reveal multiple votes by the same
vehicle. One possible solution for this challenge is to assume
limited processing capabilities for the attacker and employ
a cryptographic primitive called Proof-of-Work (PoW). As
the name implies, this primitive allows a vehicle to prove
that it has performed some amount of computation, and it
is traditionally employed to hinder denial of service attacks.
This works because the computation becomes exponentially
harder and cannot be precomputed. One proposal to use
PoW mechanisms for cITS is [119], which requires PoW for
evidence that an event actually occurred. The problem with
these approaches is that they pose significant computational
overhead, and thus cannot work in all situations. An alternative
would be assuming a functioning revocation infrastructure
with strong penalties. This significantly reduces the prevalence
of malicious nodes, since they would be removed from the
network, which reduces the required false negative rate. How-
ever, this does not protect the cITS against stronger, irrational
attacker models, since these will not care about penalties.
d) Linkable messages: While the aforementioned mech-
anisms are beneficial for detecting misbehavior, they might
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have negative impact on the location privacy the users. As
discussed above, pseudonym schemes are employed to prevent
attackers from collecting location traces of specific vehicles
over a longer time. The standardization efforts aim mainly
at preventing privacy impact on a larger scale: the goal is to
prevent attackers from efficiently following many participants,
given a few stationary attacker-controlled network nodes. This
is opposed to attackers that track a single vehicle with a
moving node – this is, after all, equivalent to physically fol-
lowing a vehicle. It has been shown by privacy research [120]
that it is possible to track vehicles in this manner, which is
indeed necessary for certain safety applications, such as those
that rely on path prediction. This functionality is provided by
employing movement models for vehicles to predict future
positions and correlate them with current positions. Such
linking can provide the necessary information, which can not
only enable cITS applications, but also misbehavior detection.
Indeed, several data-centric mechanisms, such as [71], already
exploit this approach. However, it is an open challenge to
assess the exact privacy impact of these mechanisms and
their full potential for misbehavior detection. In particular,
the reliability of these mechanisms can subsequently have a
large impact on accuracy, which an attacker could exploit. We
remark that mechanisms relying on these approaches may be
defeated by future, more powerful privacy mechanisms.
e) Cooperative misbehavior detection: As long as ve-
hicles or other entities only analyze locally received data to
detect misbehavior, trust in the derived opinions is not a big
issue. That is, we can assume that vehicles trust the mech-
anisms running locally. Even though the decisions reached
might be associated with uncertainty, that uncertainty is still
known. Once vehicles exchange reports with other vehicles,
the situation is different. A misbehavior report received by
another vehicle is basically just another item of information,
like any other information item received from remote vehicles.
Therefore, we have to assume that the misbehavior reports can
be fake as well. Some schemes propose to solve this issue
by collecting a number of misbehavior reports from different
vehicles, again using a voting mechanism, which relies on
long-term identities. Other approaches propose to solve the
issue by so-called suicide schemes where vehicles reporting
misbehavior of other vehicles also exempt themselves from
the network (see Section V-A2). However, another large share
of related work ignores the issue of trusting cooperative
misbehavior reports. These schemes assume that reports from
other vehicles are trustworthy if they carry correct signatures.
An ideal solution for cooperative misbehavior detection has
not been presented yet.
f) Level of reporting to back-end: As discussed above,
we need to rethink the level of reporting to the back-end
in order to benefit from misbehavior detection in the back-
end. If the back-end only receives reports about definite
misbehavior, then local nodes have already identified the
misbehavior. Hence, the additional benefit of involving the
back-end is limited to possible revocation of the misbehaving
nodes’ certificates. On the other hand, it is not possible to
report all data received by vehicles to the back-end because
of bandwidth constraints. It is an open challenge to find a good
trade-off between reporting somewhat suspicious behavior to
the back-end in order to allow for better attack detection and
not using too much bandwidth.
g) Comparison and Reproducibility: A final important
open issue is that many of the presented articles are difficult to
compare, because their detection mechanisms rely on different
attacker models. In this article, we attempted to describe the
differences in attacker model by illustrating vulnerabilities in
some mechanisms, but to truly compare schemes, detection
should be performed in the same scenario against the same
attacks. The simplest way to do this would be to use a
common dataset, shared between different authors, and this
is the approach suggested in [121]. However, as noted in
that article, it would be erroneous to conclude from a high
detection rate against this dataset that all attacks can be
detected. To achieve good results, a mutual development of
novel attacks and detection mechanisms is necessary. This
in turn requires that attack and detection code be published
alongside the articles, such that authors can compare results.
Unfortunately, this practice is not yet commonplace in our
field, and thus this presents an important open challenge.
C. Applications beyond cITS
Now that we have studied and classified the state of the
art misbehavior detection mechanisms for cITS, we address
the possible application of the ideas of these mechanisms to
other cyber-physical system (CPS). Although many possible
choices exist, we have chosen two domains that seem most
appropriate: WSNs, due to their ephemeral and ad-hoc nature,
and industrial control systems (ICS), due to the potential for
(especially) plausibility-based misbehavior detection mecha-
nisms that we have identified.
1) Wireless Sensor Networks: Similar to cITS, WSNs are
a type of network that is built up out of many different nodes
with significant geographic distribution and connected through
a wireless medium. Contrary to cITS, mobility is limited in
a WSN, as sensors are relatively stationary entities. The main
purpose of WSNs is to collect information in an efficient
and cost-effective manner, using cheap throw-away devices
that have a battery and a wireless transmitter. For example,
WSNs are used to monitor the temperature of the great barrier
reef [122]. For the lifetime of these networks, it is extremely
important to monitor resource usage, particularly when trans-
mitting messages, because transmission of messages is by far
the most costly operation in terms of battery power. There are
usually also one or more base stations involved in a WSN,
to provide access to the sensor functionality and to perform
more expensive operations [73].
There is already existing work that extensively surveys
attacks and defensive techniques for WSNs, which we briefly
discuss below. We discuss why these approaches cannot be
generalized to CPS, while the mechanisms we have reviewed
show significant potential to be generalized and applied to
WSNs.
Zhou et al. [73] describe the WSN setting primarily as
defined by resource-constrained sensors that perform both
sensing and processing, while having a central authority that
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establishes the network. The network is mostly static and
includes one or more base stations controlled by the author-
ity. The main security challenges identified by the authors
are the public nature of both the wireless medium and the
protocols, the lack of (physical) surveillance of nodes and
finally the extreme resource constraints. They also identify
node compromise as one of the most challenging attacks
on WSN, which we have similarly identified as applying to
general CPS. Contrary to the cITS use case, WSNs typically
also include confidentiality requirements. The authors then
provide a thorough analysis of key management protocols,
authentication and integrity, secure routing, intrusion detection
and secure applications. Out of these security mechanisms, we
focus on those relating to our discussions regarding reactive
security: integrity and intrusion detection, which are the main
issues that we see recurring in CPS.
As we have emphasized, protecting the message in transit
is not sufficient when insider attackers need to be considered.
The authors of [73] address the issue of node compromise in
their section on intrusion detection. Although node compro-
mise implies an outside attacker, the effects on the network are
essentially the same; an attacker can transmit validly signed
message (i.e., this enables misbehavior, which is what we
aim to detect). The discussed misbehavior detection mecha-
nisms raised in this work include a discussion of location-
based keys, signal analysis as discussed in Section V-B1
and countermeasures to routing misbehavior as discussed in
Section V-A1. Finally, the authors have discussed denial of
service and jamming a type of attack that is extremely hard
to detect, and secure base stations as another issue that is
fairly specific to WSNs. The authors note that it is possible
that base stations become compromised, even though they are
generally assumed to be secure, followed by a discussion of
preventive mechanisms for base stations. Similar assumptions
exist in cITS for road side units (RSUs), but the detection
of malicious RSUs is generally easier because they are not
essential to a cITS the way they are for WSNs. Mechanisms
employed for cITS could be used to address this challenge in
exchange for higher computational overhead.
Finally, as their section on open issues describes [73],
detecting intruders remains a difficult task, and many mech-
anisms only focus on a particular attack. We claim that our
survey provides further insight into what mechanisms exist,
and we include several mechanisms that describe combinations
of existing schemes. For future work, we believe a primary
goal of the CPS research community should be to develop
a more systematic approach to this problem. This approach
can then be aided by our survey, which can be used to select
different types of mechanisms to gain an overall insight of
potential attackers in the network. This includes the transfer
of mechanisms described here into the area of WSNs, in
particular the recurring patterns we have identified in the
previous section. For example, physical models that describe
the behavior of a complex system monitored by a WSN can
be used to verify the messages transmitted by individual nodes
at a base station, or at an aggregating node.
2) Unmanned Areal Vehicles: Recent advances in the devel-
opment and wide-spread adoption of unmanned areal vehicles
(UAVs) have led to the idea that it may be useful to add
communication capabilities to these devices. In some sense,
networked UAVs are thus quite similar to VANETs: both are
types of ad-hoc networks with mobile nodes and a decentral-
ized infrastructure. In contrast to cITS, where the existence of
periodic availability of back-end communication and relatively
high-power devices, UAVs put much stricter requirements
on the decentralized nature of communication. Additionally,
the application of these networks is almost exclusively rout-
ing [123], and thus the associated attacks fall outside the scope
of this survey. Future applications of UAVs that also include
application-specific information (e.g., relative positions and
speeds), which are subject to similar attacks addressed by
most detectors described in this article, as addressed by
some recent work [109]. Similarly, applications discussed
for WSNs discussed above apply equally to UAVs designed
for collaborative sensing applications, as such networks are
simply a highly dynamic variant of WSNs. Some dedicated
security mechanisms have been proposed specifically for these
networks [124], [125]; however, adopting these works to the
specifics of cITS is likely non-trivial, because these authors
specify different assumptions. For example, these assumptions
include a much lower density, no privacy requirements and
a central control system that collects the data (the ground
station in [125]). For a detailed review of security and privacy
requirements for these devices, we refer interested readers to
an existing survey on this topic [126].
3) Industrial Control Systems: Unlike cITS, ICS are a type
of CPS that has historically grown out of the field of control
systems, and the focus of these systems has primarily been
safety, rather than security [1]. Specifically, ICS must avoid
individual but random failures from escalating and causing a
cascading failure, that is, causing a shutdown of components
that are not directly related to the original failure. To this end,
much research has been conducted, but recent developments
regarding attacks on these systems, such as those by Stuxnet,
that these systems are not built to resist targeted attacks. In
the past, ICS were internal networks, which were completely
separated from the Internet by a so-called “air-gap”, meaning
no direct connectivity is possible. However, the necessity of
patching these systems and the use of re-writable media like
USB-devices has led many security researchers to conclude
that a complete “air-gap” is not a feasible solution. In addition,
secure connectivity has already provided organizations with
significant cost savings and ease of management for these
systems. Therefore, we study how misbehavior detection can
be used to improve security in these systems, in particular
against an insider attack that attempts to cause damage by
disrupting or sabotaging the industrial process controlled by
the ICS. Again, the recurring patterns we have identified for
cITS may provide significant insights for new developments in
ICS, for example through the application of physical models
to detect anomalies with high accuracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this survey, we have provided an overview of different
approaches to misbehavior detection in cITS. cITS are a
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promising type of networked system that connect vehicles,
road-side units and back-end systems in order to achieve safer,
more efficient and more comfortable travel on roads. cITS
are an instance of CPS, a type of system where interaction
between the physical world and the cyber world is a central
aspect. CPS have several unique challenges, including the
critical usage scenarios, strong resource and cost constraints,
and high scalability requirements. These challenges lead to
new and strong security requirements, which lead to the
development of misbehavior detection as a second, reactive
layer of security on top of the first, proactive layer. In the
case of cITS, this proactive security layer is the PKI, which
enables the exclusion of attackers that do not possess key
material. However, in highly constrained environments like
CPS, some network nodes may be compromised to obtain
key material; in particular, in cITS, an attacker may obtain
legitimate key material by manipulating her own vehicle to
send arbitrary messages. Therefore, reactive security in the
form of misbehavior detection is a necessary tool to provide
security in cITS. Although many of these schemes were
originally designed for vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs),
our discussion is designed to present them in the context
of upcoming cITS, where autonomous vehicles communicate.
We have surveyed such misbehavior detection mechanisms in
detail, and discussed their generalizability towards other CPS.
To this end, we have first defined the system model for cITS
(Section III) and the concept of misbehavior in these systems
(Section IV). We then presented a classification of different
misbehavior detection mechanisms that have been developed
in the literature over the last decade, designed specifically for
cITS. The classification consists of node-centric mechanisms,
which use properties of a sender to detect malicious messages,
and data-centric mechanisms, which primarily analyze the
semantics of received messages. Node-centric mechanisms can
be sub-divided in two further classes; behavioral mechanisms,
where the receiver analyzes aspects like message frequency
and conformance to standards, and trust-based mechanisms,
which allow nodes to express trust in messages or senders
directly. Data-centric mechanism can be divided in plausibility
mechanisms, analyzing the semantics of a series of packets
from an individual sender, and consistency mechanisms, which
analyze the consistency of messages received from multiple
different senders. The classification has been used to discuss
a large number of different misbehavior detection mechanisms
developed in the literature, the results of which are summa-
rized in Tables III, IV and V.
Although we have limited the survey of mechanisms to
those designed for cITS, we believe that this survey offers
a contribution to the wider field of CPS, as the novel aspects
of mechanisms developed for cITS can be used to improve the
security of other CPS. To take a first step towards this goal, we
have analyzed the common aspects in Section VI and discussed
their application to other systems from the CPS-domain. We
envision two broad paths for future work; for security in cITS,
taking further advantage of the highly orthogonal nature of
the four different classes of misbehavior detection we have
presented is of vital importance, while the generalization of
misbehavior detection mechanisms for cITS to general CPS
will allow the field to advance without sacrificing security.
This survey has provided a wide scope of different detection
approaches, which provides a conclusive overview of and in-
troduction to the field for industry, developers, standardization
agencies, and aspiring researchers in this field.
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